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I. INTRODUCTION
It was over seventy-five years ago that the concept of regulatory
takings embedded itself into twentieth-century American jurispru-
dence against the backdrop of Pennsylvania's anthracite coalfields.'
With Justice Holmes' allusion to regulation of land that "goes too
far,"' scholars and jurists began their quest to define a workable tak-
ings formula.3 Following decades of largely unsuccessful attempts,4
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. J.D. 1981, Boalt Hall
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (striking down a prohibition against
mining coal when private contract had expressly reserved such right).
SId. at 415.
See e.g., Steven J. Eagle & William H. Mellor III, Regulatory Takings After the Supreme Court's
1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 209 (1992) (describing the
Supreme Court's takings decisions as being incremental and evolutionary, not radical);John A.
Humbach, "Taking" the ImperialJudiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revision
of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993) (describing Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1994), as a radical return to judicial activism in takings jurisprn-
dence); Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 9 (1993) (describing the history of takings jurisprudence to be one of
judicial restraint);Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U.
TOL L. Rev. 281 (1993) (analyzing the expected effect that Lucas will have on the decisions of
courts of the Great Lakes states);Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE LJ. 1077 (1993) (considering
the effect of reinvigorating the language of "for public use"); Laura M. Schleich, Takings: The
Fifth Amendment, Government Regulation, and the Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 381 (1993) (proposing an analysis of "relevant parcel"); Charles R. Wise, The Changing
Doctrine of Regulatory Taking and the Executive Branch, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 403 (1992) (evaluating
responses of the Executive Branch to takings jurisprudence); David C. Buck, Note, "Property" in
the Ffth Amendment: A Quest for Common Ground in the Maze of Regulatoy Takings, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1283, 1287 (1993) (discussing "the history and ramifications of the Court's failure to define
Fifth Amendment 'property'"); Thomas P. Glass, Note, Property Law: Takings and the Nuisance
Exception in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 18 U. DAYrON L. REV. 509
(1993) (attempting to define the proper standard in takings cases); Paul F. Haffner, Note, Regu-
latoy Takings - A New Categorical Rule: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 61 U. CIN. L.
Rev. 1035 (1993) (proposing a more balanced approach in lieu of a categorical rule in takings
jurisprudence); Ann T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. Rev. 415 (1993) (examining the role and application
of an "economically viable use" test).
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the Supreme Court has in the past few years signaled its impatience
with its traditional open-ended balancing approach5 and has indi-
cated a desire to provide a more definite interpretation of the tak-
ings doctrine. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court
held that a government regulation which leads to a total diminution
in the value of a parcel constitutes a per se taking.! This unprece-
dented and somewhat surprising decision of the Cour again
' See eg. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding a taking when there was no
"essential nexus" between the regulation and the public use desired); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a deprivation of all viable economic use of
land constitutes a taking per se); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(holding that while permits may be conditionally granted to fulfill a legitimate governmental
purpose, such conditions may themselves amount to an impermissible taking); Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding a regulation against a claim
that the affected segment of subsurface land should be considered separately from rest of par-
cel); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (finding that a prohibition of the sale of eagle feath-
ers was not a taking despite the fact that such regulation deprives the owner of the most valu-
able use of her property); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
[hereinafter Penn Central] (upholding the application of a landmarks preservation law as applied
to Grand Central Terminal in NewYork); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393 (1922)
(holding that regulations are takings if and only if they go "too far"); Hadacheck v. Sebastian.
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a regulation which prohibited the manufacture of bricks uithin
specified limits of the city because the regulation was enacted in good faith to advance a legiti-
mate state interest); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that there is not a taking
when the use of property is restricted to advance the health, morals, or safety of the public);
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cmt. denied, 479 U.S.
1053 (Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 88-465), on remand to 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) judgment entered 23 a. Ct.
653 (1991) (acknowledging that a taking can result from regulation even if there is no physical
invasion of property); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988) (denying
motion for summary judgment by applying standard for takings that requires the loss of all eco-
nomicallyiable use).
' See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Takings 46J. Leg. Ed. 586, 594 (1996) (de-
scribing Lucas as a "categorical rule-sort of; Craig Haabicht, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Taking a Closer Look At Rgudato Takings, 45 CATH. U.L RE%. 221, 231 (1995) (arguing that the
Court's decision in Dolan, though limited, "broke new ground"); Daniel S. Huffenus, Dolan
Meets Nollan: Towards a Workable Takings Test for Devdopment Exactions Qe.% 4 N.Y.U. F_%A. L.J.
30 (1995) (arguing that the Court reoriented its takings analysis to address development extrac-
tions).
6 Huffenus, supra note 5, at 47.
505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992) (holding that "a regulation that declares off4imits' all eco-
nomically productive or beneficial uses of land" is a taking).
s Before the Court's decision in Lucas, many commentators shared the view that the Court
was likely to fit its facts into the "nuisance exception" category of cases. See gentrally Raymond
Coletta, The Twiogy That Faikd, 2 CAL. LAND USE LWAND POL'YRpm. 4 (1992) (remarking that.
"land use scholars became more convinced that the Supreme Court mus determined to reforge
the historic deference given to legislative regulation of landowners' use of their parcels'); Cath-
erine R. Connors, Back to the Future" The Wuisanze Exception" to the Just Comptnsation Clause, 19
CAP. U.L REv. 139 (1989) (analyzing the various ways the nuisance exception n be applied by
the Court); Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM.J. EvrL
L 1, 3 (1993) (finding the Lucas decision to be a major analytical innovation).
1998]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
brought into immediate focus the issue of how to define the unit of
property against which economic impact is measured.9
The threshold issue of determining the relevant parcel for regu-
latory takings analysis is exceptionally complex. Adding to the con-
fusion is the fact that the courts have been unwilling or incapable of
directly confronting the issue.0 While most courts go through a
lengthy analysis of takings jurisprudence, their determination of
what constitutes a "relevant parcel" seems to be an almost visceral
conclusion. This latter determination, however, is the proverbial
"tail that wags the dog." Unquestionably, the more narrowly the unit
of parcel is defined, the more likely a finding of a taking becomes.
9 Differing approaches have been taken by the courts. Courts may consider a regulation's
effect on the parcel of land itself or may focus on the regulation's effect on a right that they
deem part of the ownership of property. See e.g. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498 (holding 27 million
tons of coal, constituting less than 2% of the petitioners' coal, required to be kept in place to
provide support for the overlying surface land did not constitute a separate parcel); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1986) (discussing the right to devise a property interest); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16 (1982) (holding that 36 feet of
cable one-half inch in diameter and two 4 x 4 x 4 metal boxes, about one-eighth of a cubic foot
of space on the roof of appellant's Manhattan apartment building was a separate parcel); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (discussing that the right to exclude the public
from a dredged pond turned into a marina); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66 (holding that "the denial
of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."); Penn Central 438 U.S. 104 (dis-
cussing a city block designated as a landmark site); Elsmere Park Club Ltd. v. Town of Elsmere,
771 F. Supp. 646, 647 (1991) (finding that 39 basement level units were an independent parcel
in the Elsmere Park Apartments); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 313 (1991) (discuss-
ing takings treatment of approximately 45 total acres, about 14 of which were within state-
designated wetands);Jentgen v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1981) (discussing 80 acres covered
by applications, 60 of which were proposed for development and 20 of which were to be pre-
served in the natural state); American Dredging Co. v. NewJersey, 404 A.2d 42 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (viewing plaintiff's 2500-acre tract in its entirety when determining whether
restrictions on eighty acres prevented all use of the property).
'0 See Schleich, supra note 3, at 395. Schleich states that:
The term 'relevant parcel' does not appear in most decisions involving takings claims.
Typically, a court overlooks the problem of identifying the relevant parcel either because
the affected parcel appears obvious to all parties, as in the case of a taking by eminent
domain, or because the court makes unexplained assumptions about the dimensions of
the parcel and then immediately shifts its attention to the economic analysis. (citation
omitted)
Id. The Court has on occasion given a cursory look to the relevant parcel. See e.g. Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that while property "may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if it goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-19 nn. 7-8 (re-
serving specifically the issue of defining the property interest); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603
(1927) (upholding a setback on the grounds that the property overall was usable); Humbach,
supra note 3, at 799 ("Like Pennsylvania Coal, Gorieb does not discuss segmentation explic-
itly."); see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (stating that a critical question is determining how to de-
fine the unit of property); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 400-402 (1994) (requiring
analysis to focus on the impact of the city's action on the entire parcel); Tabb Lakes, Inc. v.
U.S., 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992) (refusing to determine as a matter of law the definition of the
whole parcel).
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Conversely, the more expansive the definition of the relevant parcel,
the less likely a finding of a regulatory taking becomes."
The contours of a workable definition of the takings' parcel have
yet to be agreed upon. While this is an area where one would think
that reasoned analysis and considered jurisprudence should domi-
nate,' 2 in reality, significant barriers to a rational, policy-based solu-
tion exist. The American notion of property is deeply rooted in our
biological predisposition and is outwardly molded byJudeo-Christian
culture.'1 Although we may view ourselves as a society of rational de-
cision-makers, we remain significantly controlled by both our emo-
tions and our limited range of perceptions, each system formed over14-
eons of evolutionary development to ensure reproductive success m
the face of various selective forces.'" The elevation in western socie-
ties of the rational person as the ideal is, to some extent, a product
" The Court has on occasion broadly defined the parcel and subsequently not found a tak-
ing. See ag. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-1 (holding that the plaintiff cannot segment the prop-
erty into air and surface rights); Ciampitt, 22 Cl. Ct. at 320 (concluding that there was not a tak-
ing of plaints property and plaintiff had "treated all of Purchase 7, which encompasses
virtually all the lots at issue, as a single parcel for purposes of purchasing and financing. It would
be inappropriate to allow him now to sever the connection he forged when it assists in making a
legal argument."). Examples also exist where courts have narrowly defined the parcel and have
subsequently found a taking. See eg. Pennsykania Coa 260 U.S. 393 (separating the surface es-
tate from the mineral and support estate in assessing a takings claim); florida Rack Indus v.
United StatA 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (identiying 98 acres of a 1,560 acre tract as a parcel
for takings claim); Loveladies Harbor v. United StaeSj 15 C. CL 381 (1938) (discussing 12.5 acres
of a 250 acre tract in finding a taking).
'2 Indeed, if this were the case, one would expect that a definition would have been agreed
upon much earlier.
See infra notes 241-67 and accompanying text.
14 Characteristics of individuals that ensure reproductive success are much more likely to
continue into later generations than characteristics that do not engender reproductive success.
Adaptive traits increase in frequency in a population because their bearers contribute propor-
tionally more offspring to succeeding generations. Our emotions are a highly evolved system
that furthers the species in numerous ways. See generally DAVID BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND
BEHAVIOR (1977) (arguing for the relevance of evolution to human social behavior); IREN.US
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, LOVE AND HATE (1971) (discussing biological bases for human emotions and
social interactions); and EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMtAN NATURE (1978) (applying population
biology and evolutionary theory to human social organization).
" Evolution is a theory describing why and how organisms change with the passage of time.
Natural selection, first described by Charles Darwin, is the mechanism that forms die key to the
evolutionary process. Individuals possessing characteristics which render them more capable of
surviving and reproducing will be better represented in the next generation than individuals
less fit. In essence, natural selection is the differential reproduction of individuals and their
genes from one generation to the next. Reproduction-enhancing traits are 'favored.'
For a basic introduction to evolutionary biology, se ROBERT TRIERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION
(1985) (focusing especially on the social aspects of evolution); MATr RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:
SEx AND THE Evolution OF HuLMAN NATURE (1993) (seeking to describe essential human na-
ture); TIMOTHY GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN MTUR.: FORGING LINKS
BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1991) (emphasizing the importance of biology to under-
standing human behavior while acknowledging its limitations).
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of mass self-deception. 16 Humans simply are not purely rational ac-
tors, nor do they consistently make informed decisions in this re-
gard. Although we might base our legislative and judicial decisions
on supposedly "weighty" policy and jurisprudential analyses, in truth
we remain prisoners of our biological-cultural heritage. This heri-
tage influences how we view the world, and thereby colors our no-
tions of what is right, just, or fair.'7 Additionally, it provides a ques-
tionable foundation upon which to build our subsequent thought
processes and jurisprudence.
Human evolutionary origins have also molded our perception of
property. We are strikingly territorial, orienting ourselves spatially in
the world, occupying and defending surface territories. This out-
ward-directedness has fashioned a human territorial imperative that
minimizes vertical significance while stressing horizontal value. The
human emotional repertoire likewise emphasizes absoluteness and
possessiveness as the species' characteristic property strategies. 8
Strong feelings surround the sense of ownership and any attack on
its inviolability generates visceral reactions at the expense of rational,
unbiased inquiry. Feelings of stability, security and well-being mirror
ownership; one's property "feels" like it should be one's individual
domain.
These biological predispositions that drive how we view and relate
to land are further intensified by the socio-economic culture of the
United States. Our history of taming the wilderness and exploiting
the natural contours of the environment' 9 reveals an economic ori-
entation to the land. We have developed an individual braggadocio
toward real property, focusing on the "my-ness" of land and its eco-
nomic meaning to individual status. We exploit rather than conserve
this valued resource. Private land ownership has gained an idiosyn-
cratic American personality reflecting notions of economic power,
individual self-meaning, and personal self-worth. Not surprisingly,
where regulation leads to lessening land values, we feel unjustly
compromised as well as personally devalued.
16 Compare Villiam H. Rodgers,Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of Salmon in
the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821, 827 (1995) (arguing that self-deception plays a role in evo-
lution).
" An excellent collection of essays in this area is THE SENSE OFJUSTICE (1992) (Roger Mas-
ters and Margaret Gruter, eds.). These articles look at current scientific research into the bases
of human nature and describe how our notions ofjustice and our moral values have developed.
" See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text.
"See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (describing the treatment of American Indians in the law as
being conducive to conquest and empire). See generally WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE
LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983) (giving a history of New
England by focusing on the natural ecosystem); CAROL M. ROSE, Possession as the Origin of Prop
erty, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985) (examining possession as a basis for property rights).
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Given our biological and cultural heritage, Americans begin the
takings debate with an overwhelming prejudice in favor of private
property rights. We perceive limitations on land use as a threat and
are psychologically wired to presume any such limitation as a taking
of a natural right.20 Indeed, the extraordinary emotions associated
with takings cases reflect the underlying discord that is produced
when our visceral conception of the property relation is altered by
judicial or legislative act. The Holmesian "too-far" line may be the ef-
fective indicator of the outer limits of our basic property gestalt.2 ' If
we are biologically and culturally predisposed to view land in a cer-
tain pre-defined way, these predispositions will necessarily influence
our takings calculus.
The "diminution in value" test is an investigation into the defini-
tion of a relevant parcel. This Article will suggest that the determina-
tion of a relevant parcel is as much, if not more, a captive of our
combined biology and culture as it is an analysis of relevant policy
considerations. The spatially-horizontal orientation of humans dic-
tates our emotional response to various severance issues.-- Because
our passions are focused on the horizontal plane, we are lead to dis-
count subconsciously value inherent in air and subsurface rights.
This results in the relevant parcel being defined almost exclusively in
terms of surface values. Likewise, our American cultural prejudices
focus our attention on the economic gains or losses of the individual
landowner. Our social learning has elevated the myth of the rugged
individualist at the expense of moral tales exalting the norms of
community responsibility and accountability.2 Where the economic
consequence of regulation largely falls on the individual, we are pre-
disposed to cry, "foul" and seek restitution.
It is, therefore, important to recognize our human and cultural
limitations when addressing the takings issue. Only by recognizing
the predispositions that we bring to the question can we more fully
understand the force associated with, and the shortcomings inherent
See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 273-294 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 247 and accompanying text.
Notably, other legal systems stress the chain of duties associated uith property ownership,
rather than the American orientation of individual autonomy. See eg., DOL.ZER PROPERTY AND
ENVIRONM.NT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION INHERENT IN O\%ERSHIP 17 (1976) (citing Article 14 of
the Basic law of Germany). Section 2 states that "property entails obligations. Its use shall also
serve the public good." Consequently, under German law, "individual sacrifice" may be de-
manded in order to protect the public good. Once a "potential social obligation" is established,
the private landowner can no longer claim any vested interest in socially disruptive property
rights. Id.
At the turn of the century in France, Leon Duguit attacked the Lockean individualistic con-
cept of property. Duguit wrote, "Property is no longer the subjective right of the proprietor, but
the social function of the holder of wealth." LEON DUGUIT, TRANSFORMIATIONS DU DROIT PRIVIE
158 (1912), as translated in CRIBBEr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 446 (2d ed. 1975).
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in, our analytical arguments. Merely because we subconsciously cling
to the notion of the inviolability of private property rights does not
mean that logical arguments for a social understanding of property
are less cogent or less right. Nor does the fact that such a social pol-
icy has logical coherence necessarily mean that it should be adopted
in the face of strong human predispositions to the contrary. To en-
sure a full understanding of the appropriate standard for defining a
relevant parcel, we must consider competing analytical positions
against conceptions driven to the forefront by our basic human na-
ture. Only by becoming aware of our evolutionary and cultural bi-
ases can we hope to adequately address the jurisprudential issue of
the Holmesian "too-far" line.
The Supreme Court has yet to give any clear guidance on how to
define the appropriate unit of property for regulatory takings analy-
sis. 24 Justices Rehnquist and Scalia seem to be pointing the current
Court in the direction of narrowly defining the unit of parcel . Such
21 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding
simply that "[wihen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economi-
cally beneficial uses ... he has suffered a taking") (emphasis original); Keystone v. Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-99 (1987) (explaining that there was no reason to
treat petitioners' interest in less than 2% of coal as a separate parcel of property); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the right to exclude a fundamental
element of property rights falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot
take without compensation); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (explaining that the
destruction of one strand in the bundle of rights is not a taking because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety); The Court has also noted that:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978).
2' See e.g. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143 n.5, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (restating the view of
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946), which held that air rights over an area of land
are property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment). Rehnquist also noted that:
[Tihe term "property" as used in the Takings Clause includes the entire "group of rights
inhering in the citizen's [ownership]." The term is not used in the "vulgar and untech-
nical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recog-
nized by law. [Instead, it] ... denotes the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation
to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it... The constitutional provi-
sion is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess."
Penn Centra, 438 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1945))
(emphasis and alteration in original).
See also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512-515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
should consider whether the value of the separate burdened segment of property had been to-
tally extinguished or merely diminished). Rehnquist maintained that the restricted right to
mine pillars of coal is a separate, completely extinguished property interest. Interference with a
separate identifiable segment of property was sufficient to constitute a taking. Rehnquist also
stated that the nuisance exception to the takings clause "is a narrow exception allowing the gov-
ernment to prevent 'a misuse or illegal use,' and it "is not intended to allow 'the prevention of a
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a definition would lead to an exponential expansion of regulatory
taking claims, yielding uncertain consequences for the environ-
mental and preservationist movements..2 6 Such short-sighted and le-
gally specious analysis furthers few jurisprudential goals while plac-
ing our natural environment at exceptional risk. Nonetheless, their
jurisprudential arguments find great sympathy in the American con-
sciousness, arguably less a testament to their analytical worth than to
their appeal to human nature.
This Article primarily seeks to demonstrate the extraordinary
"pull" of our biological proclivities and cultural alignment in ad-
dressing the issue of regulatory takings. Our resulting psychological
orientation severely narrows our ability to address the issue logically
and to analyze rationally in pursuit of an advantageous solution. In-
deed, this Article will suggest that sound analysis necessitates that the
unit of property be expansively defined. If this is done, Luca.s in-
terpretation of Justice Holmes' "diminution in value" standard will
increasingly become an interesting footnote rather than a major re-
interpretation of regulatory takings jurisprudence. By recognizing
the basic gestalt that we bring to our evaluation of this issue, we can
more fully understand the cogency of the analytical arguments as
well as the limitations of some of our sympathies. The prevention of
legal and essential use.'" Id. at 512 (quoting Curlin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78. 86 (1911)). Justice
Scalia went on to adopt this narrow view in Lucas when he stated that the nuisance exception
would be controlled by state law. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. 'Justice Scalia's threshold inquiry is, in
essence, a vehicle to determine whether the proscribed use fits Rehnquist's narrow construction
of the nuisance exception." Glass, supra note 3, at 530.
See generally Alfred P. Le'.itt, Comment, Taking on a New Dirwion. The Rehnquist.,.alia Ap-
proach to ReguZatoiy Takings, 66 TEMIP. L REV. 197, 217-18 (1993) (describing the Rehnquist-
Scalia approach as calculating the diminution of value by reference to the smallest identifiable
interest in property).
'6 Based upon his dissents in Kejstone and Penn Centra! and his opinion in Lucas, it appears as
though Rehnquist is pushing a narrow segmentation view of the relevant parcel. The ability of
Scalia to gamer a majority for this approach in Lucas suggests that the modem court may well
have found a taking had it been presented the opportunity to consider both Keptone and Penn
CntraL
, See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hockery: A Comment on Midhdman, 88 COLUM. L REV.
1697, 1711 (1988) (arguing that the Court needs to develop a principled resolution to the tak-
ings question); Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990 - The Uncertain
Legacy of the Supreme Court ; Lucas and Yee Decisions; 43 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONEMMP. L 85, 118
(1993) ("Takings jurisprudence was a muddle before the Supreme Court handed down 1' and
Lucas; and a muddle it remains. In theory, the Supreme Court should provide clear guidance
and direction to lower courts, litigants and the public regarding important constitutional ques-
tions."); See also Buck, supra note 3, at 1285 ("After more than seventy years, the Supreme Court
continues to wander in its self-imposed maze when determining at what point government regu-
lation of land use constitutes a compensable taking."); It. at 1330 ("The greatest problem
caused by the current muddle of takings jurisprudence in today's regulatory climate... is its
uncertainty to owners and to planners and regulators.*); Id. at 1331 ("The certainty derived
from a per se model would protect an owner's investment-backed expectations and assist gov-
ernment planning decisions.").
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conceptual severance and the inclusion of all originally purchased
acreage and horizontally contiguous lots will ground takings juris-
prudence in sound policy and advance our social order. Unfortu-
nately, this orientation will also cause some core emotional discord
since it is contrary to our inherent psychological order.
This Article will seek to uncover the depth of control that our bi-
ology and culture exert in this arena. Only by understanding our ba-
sic psychological orientation toward property can we hope to gain a
clearer perception of the issues involved. Section Two of this Article
will briefly describe the general historical background of how prop-
erty is viewed for regulatory takings proposes. Section Three will
analyze the major attempts that have been made at defining the rele-
vant unit of property and evaluate the policies underlying these ma-
jor jurisprudential positions. Section Three will consider the par-
ticular contributions that biological and cultural analyses can bring
to an understanding of the issue as well as illustrate the extraordi-
nary force and overwhelming bias these predispositions bring to the
debate.
II. HISTORY OF THE MEASURING STICK
The controversy regarding definition of the relevant parcel has
existed since the inception of regulatory takings doctrine. In large
part, the problem of parcel identity is inexorably connected to the
historical development of the takings issue. The sweeping regulatory
powers enjoyed by governments at the turn of the century were
based on a view of land ownership that accepted expansive police
power and strong nuisance control.29 As land ownership increased
in value and government regulation became more pervasive,0 there
was renewed interest in developing limits to government's regulatory
power.3' Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 2 marked the emergence of a
2' Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887) (holding that a state can regulate alcohol
without violating the constitutional guarantees of liberty and property).
" See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("There must be progress, and if in
its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of the community.").
30 See e.g. Chicago & Alton R.R Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 77 (1915) (upholding a stat-
ute compelling railroad companies to construct and maintain suitable openings across rights of
way and roadbeds in order to drain surface water and prevent flooding); Reinman v. City of Lit-
tie Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (upholding legislation regulating location of livery stables
even though not nuisances per se, in particular circumstances the state could find they were
nuisances in fact); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) (upholding a statute that
prohibited any person having charge of sheep from allowing them to graze on a range previ-
ously occupied by cattle); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (upholding a federal rent
control statute that allowed tenants to remain in their apartments at a fixed rate of rent)." Throughout American history, land value and regulatory controls increased proportion-
ately. There certainly exists a defined nexus between the two: order and function are often re-
flected in value. As resources become scarcer and the number of potential users becomes
greater, the scope of regulation is increased to meet these new demands. While once scattered
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formal regulatory takings doctrine and signaled changing judicial at-
titudes toward property ownership. Rather than concentrating on
the magnitude of the public interest, the economics of ownmership
took center stage. Formulating and developing the takings issue in
this manner necessitated a heightened focus for the unit of parcel in
question. The extent of the diminution in the property's use and
value became one of the central measuring sticks that courts ap-
plied.ss But in order to calculate the economics of diminution, it was
first necessary to determine the scope of what was being reduced.
A. Background of Regulatoy Takings
In mid-nineteenth century America, courts were not besieged
with challenges to government regulatory actions. Society simply ac-
cepted most of the imposed governmental regulations of land. Be-
cause the legislation was minimal and usually enhanced the value of
the land involved, there was no perceived conflict between the gov-
ernmental regulation and the American tradition of strong priate
property rights. Indeed, much of the relevant legislation was aimed
at either nuisance abatement or conflict prevention - both goals
which directly enhanced the value of landowners' parcels." The Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause was applied mainly to
straight-forward physical acquisitions, and even then often spar-
ingly.s
and infrequent regulation could be explained as a property maximizing event, increasingly per-
vasive regulation raises the specter of government intrusiveness. Government enhancement of
the individual property right was seen as government interference vith private proper w . See
infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
&e, &g., Carol Mi Rose, Mahon Reconstnudez Il
7iy the Taldngs Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L REV. 561, 562 (1984) (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal "originated what has come to be
known as the diminution in value test to determine whether there has been a taking of prop-
erty."); see also Euclid, 272 U.S. 365; Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (1931)
(upholding land and water commission's denial of proposed 1800 acre development upon find-
iag the development would pollute wetlands); Kendall, supra note 3, at 570-75 (noting Ete
Court's increased rigor to the diminution in .alue test); Daniel Riesel & Steven Barshov, 111m.n
Does Government Regulation Go 'Too Far," C127 A.LL-A.B.A. 889, 896 (1995) ("A government
regulation which goes too far is not simply a denial of due process of law, te remedy for vhich
is a declaration of invalidity. Rather such a regulation constitutes a taking of property for which
just compensation must be paid.").
34 Nuisance law is essentially a recognition of the need to limit individual property rights in
specialized situations. Sic utero tuo reflects the notion thmt the imposition of restraints on indi-
vidual parcel owners maximizes the worth of all parcels.
See Note, TakingBack Takings:A Coascan Approach to Regulation, 106 -IANRY. L REV. 914, 917-
918 (1993) ("Prior to Justice Holmes' 1922 decision in Pennslrania Coal, American courts re-
jected the idea of a regulatory taking. In medieval England, during the colonial era and
through the first century of our Republic, the government generally paid compensation only for
direct, physical appropriations. Regulations that served the public interest were ecempt.");Jed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE UJ. 1077, 1081 (1993) ("Most of the original American state consti-
tuions contained no compensation clause, and uncompensated seizures of property for public
1998]
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Within such a climate, judicial acceptance of land use regulation
was not uncommon. 6 This acceptance reached its zenith in Mugler v.
Kansas!' In a carefully tailored opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court
ruled that the regulation of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquor was a legitimate exercise of the police power, notwithstanding
the significant destruction of property value. Even though property
was firmly linked to usage rights and individuals continued to see
their land as their private kingdoms to exploit for their economic
welfare, government action, reasonably taken for the public good,
could legitimately and constitutionally "injure" private property in-
terests. With Mugler, the notion of government regulation as a tak-
ing of private property receded from the forefront ofjudicial consid-
eration in takings cases. Justice Harlan wrote:
The police power embraces regulations designed to promote the public
convenience and general prosperity as well as the public health, safety,
and morals.. .The just compensation clause is not intended as a limit of
the exercise of the police power necessary for the tranquillity of every
well-ordered community or the orderly existence of government.
The Court repeated this position for the next two decades.
roads and other uses were not unusual in eighteenth-century America."); Id. at 1082 ("For
about the first century of state and federal constitutional law, outside of formal eminent-domain
proceedings initiated by the government, the compensation guarantee was applied extremely
restrictively. Occasionally courts would find for the plaintiff in inverse condemnation suits, but
even in such cases there was, for most of the nineteenth century, 'a limitation of the term tak-
ing to the actual physical appropriation of property or a divesting of title.'") (quoting SEDGWICK,
A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (New York, 1857)).
Horwitz and Treanor have noted that colonial America regularly allowed government ex-
propriation of private property without just compensation. Commenting on the origins of the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment, both authors argue that uncompensated
takings were frequent during this period in our history. Central to such theory, each empha-
sized the absence of ajust compensation requirement from the first state constitutions and the
allegedly common practice of taking private lands for public roads. According to this position,
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment was a conservative reaction to colonial legislators'
subordination of private interests for the common good. See generally MORTON HoRWI'z, TIlE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 63-64 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Note, "The
Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,"
94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985), reprinted in 17 LAND USE & ENV. L. REV. 127 (1986) (arguing that the
post-independence movement for just compensation was a shift away from republicanism and its
emphasis on the primary good.).
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Prohibition of use resulting in diminution of value is very different from taking property.
However, land still economically prized for its development and use capabilities was now held
under an expanded "implied obligation" that such development and use not conflict with major
social goals. There was an underlying sense in the opinion that the Court accepted the strict
property-rightist orientation of the day, but equally realized the inherent conflict that absolute
property rights would breed in an increasingly crowded society.
" 123 U.S. at 669.
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As late as 1915, the Court continued to separate usage legislation
from takings analysis. Hadacheck v. Sebastian'r echoed the basic tenets
of Mugler, upholding legislation that directly impacted the use and
value of private land. In Hadacheck, perhaps its last grand embrace of
this traditional jurisprudential position, the Court refused to find a
takings when a Los Angeles ordinance denied a brickyard owner
most of the value of his parcel.4 ' Reemphasizing the need for restric-
tions on the unfettered rights of ownership, the Court characterized
the police power as "one of the most essential powers of the govern-
ment, one that is least limitable."12 In the Court's view, progress
seemed to demand some fundamental concessions on the part of
private property owners. The basic notion of regulatory takings was
soundly rejected as the Court paid homage to the perceived necessi-
ties of social progress and the general economic enhancement that
such progress bestowed on private property."
As small towns became urbanized and populations increased,"
new pressures created escalating tensions between social interests
and private rights. The Court's deference to the wide scope of the
police power continued unabated through the first part of the twen-
tieth century. While individuals could readily understand the sic utero
tuo limitation to their vested property rights, the American vision did
not encompass overtly expansive governmental interference. The
Muglarview of free ranging police power remained at odds with the
common individual's understanding of private rights. Clashes were
inevitable. Judicial reexamination came in 1922 with Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.
Pennsylvania Coal constructed a barrier to unrestrained Mulgarian
regulation. In a very direct and relatively brief opinion, Justice
Holmes formally gave birth to legal recognition of the concept of
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
41 Id at 405. Hadacheck noted that the use of his land for the manufacture of bricks had a
fair market value of $800,000; there remained little if any value in other uses, perhaps a maxi-
mum of $60,000 for residential purposes. Hadacheck also emphasized that his existing brick-
yard was not a nuisance as it emitted little smoke, no noise, and there had been no complaints
from neighbors for over seven years. I&
Id. at 410.
'0 See id. ("There must be progress, and if in its march private interests be in the uay they
must yield to the goal of the community.").
"The distinguishing feature of many nineteenth-century cities %as concentration and den-
sity. As the century progressed, the more gracious and open pattern of the colonial city disap-
peared. The spaces between buildings vanished and buildings grew higher. For most of the
nineteenth century, cities became both more populous and more dense. Industry a s. concen-
trated most often in the central areas of cities. Congestion had more than just aesthetic or psy-
chological consequences. In an age before treatment of water supplies and modem sewage dis-
posal, the congestion of the city exacted a huge cost in life and health. See grywralljJOt N N.
LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN PLANNING, 10-12 (2nd ed. 1991).
4 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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regulatory takings. In so doing, Justice Holmes placed a real limita-
tion on the government's ability to regulate private property at the
landowner's economic expense. In Pennsylvania Coal, Pennsylvania's
Kohler Act took away a coal company's right to mine the support es-
tate where the same would cause subsidence of "any structure used as
a human habitation."4" The legislature had, in effect, wrapped itself
in notions of public good and police power necessity, stressing the
dangers that such subsidence posed for the community."
Justice Holmes' reply was brief. The property right in the coal
was illusory without the right to mine the coal.4" Any regulation that
denied this right of appropriation resulted in a taking of private
property without compensation even if numerous police power con-
cerns existed. Justice Holmes stressed, " [w] e are in danger of forget-
ting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change."49 The visitation of un-
bargained for benefits on the community at large could not negate
the private property rights of a landowner who faced substantial eco-
nomic wipeout of his property interests. While noting that property
interests at times must yield to the necessities of the police power,
Justice Holmes concluded that "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.
5 0
Pennsylvania Coal was thus a marked change from the community
idealism of Mugler Justice Holmes failed to focus on whether the
Kohler Act was a reasonable exercise of the state's regulatory author-
ity. He concentrated first and foremost on the effect that the Act
had on private property interests. The Court's focus was thus shifted
from a preference for regulation that met minimum reasoned crite-
ria 2 to a preference for regulation which prioritized free enjoyment
46 Id. at 412-413.
', Id. at 413-414.
" See id. at 414.
'9 See id. at 416.
Id. at 415.
Justice Holmes would later write that he had "always thought that old Harlan's decision in
Mugler v. Kansas was pretty fishy." Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold Laski Uan. 21, 1923),
in 5 HOmES-LASKI LETrERS (Mark Howe, ed., 1963).
2 See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that a court
should overturn the action of public officers only if their action "has no foundation in reason
and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the pub.
lic health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in the proper sense.");
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the stat-
ute denied rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("[T]he imperative necessity for [the police power's] existence precludes
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily."); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger,
238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915) ("[I]t is well settled that the enforcement of uncompensated obedience
to a legitimate regulation established under the police power is not a taking of property without
compensation, or without due process of law, in the sense of the 14th Amendment."); Reinman
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of private property. Justice Holmes' majority opinion therefore gave
renewed recognition to America's traditional laissez faire property
orientation and reemphasized the linkage between economic stabil-
ity and private property expectations. If a regulation went "too far"
in its economic impact upon the landowner, it could be deemed to
be a takings which would then requirejust compensation."
B. Pennsylvania Coal and the Measuring Stick
Once courts viewed the government's power to regulate land
use as limited, they began to wrestle with the question of how much
interference with a landowner's use and control should be permissi-
ble.- Historically, regulatory takings were measured quantitatively,
through judicial inquiry asking, for example, whether the govern-
ment actions had "gone too far". Given this approach, the initial
status of the parcel was of prime importance. Beginning with Penn-
sylvania Coal7, the determination of regulatory takings was inexora-
bly tied to the extent of the regulation's economic impact on the
parcel at issue.
Justice Holmes' notion of "too far" was quite simple; the police
power was not unlimited. Justice Holmes described the point beyond
which the interference with traditional notions of private property
v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915) (holding that -so long as the regulation in ques-
tion is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary.. . it cannot be judicially declared
that there is a deprivation of property without due process of law, or denial of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Certainly, takings analysis is not coterminous with economic analysis. Regulatory takings
have been found to occur in a number of settings where .aluation uw not at issue. See Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that statute consti-
tuted a taking as permitting a permanent physical occupation, even though there uns a negligi-
ble economic impact under diminution analysis). The focus of this article is primarily on the
economic dimensions of the takings issue.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 131 (rejecting the proposi-
tion that diminution of property value, standing alone, can establish a taking, so long as the
government is acting in furtherance of a legitimate goal); Eudi4 272 U.S. at 365 (upholding an
ordinance allegedly reducing the property value from $10,000 to $2,500 per acre).
See also Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981) (holding that the Comm-is
sion's requirement that the proposed development be reduced by half %as a valid exercise of
police power); Rose, supra note 34, at 562 (noting that Pennsylhania Cal 'originated what has
come to be known as the diminution in value test to determine whether there has been a taking
of property."); id. at 566 (explaining that the test has been troubling from the outset because it
fails to answ-er how much diminution in value is too much); Levitt. supra note 26, at 212 (-The
Keystone majority also found that application of the diminution of value test did not support the
takings claim." (internal citation omitted)); Riesel & Barshov, supra note 34, at 896 ('A gov-
ernment regulation which 'goes too far' is not simply a denial of due process of law, the remedy
for which is a declaration of invalidity. Rather such a regulation constitutes a taking of property
for which just compensation must be paid.") (citing First English Evangdical Luthtan Church of
Glendale v. County of LosAnges 482 U.S. 304,315 (1987)); Luarns 112 S. Ct. At 2892-93).
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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could not be ignored quantitatively. 56 The express yardstick of Jus-
tice Holmes' calculus was the extent to which the government's in-
terference with a landowner's use and control resulted in a diminu-
tion in property value. When costs to the owner reached a certain
magnitude, government could no longer hide behind the veil of the
police power and deny compensation. As the Justice stressed, "[w] e
are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.,1
7
In framing his analysis, Justice Holmes impliedly accepted that the
coal comprising the support estate constituted the relevant parcel of
measurement. Since the Kohler Act potentially prevented access to
any of this resource, the taking was absolute. This legislation de-
stroyed one hundred percent of the applicable property interest. In
Pennsylvania Coal, the complete diminution in value of the property
rendered the question of what is "too far" moot.
It is important to stress how Justice Holmes' delineation of the
relevant parcel determined the outcome in Pennsylvania Coal. By al-
lowing the support estate to constitute the denominator or relevant
parcel, Justice Holmes defined a total taking. Had he adopted a
more expansive view of the initial estate, the measured diminution in
value would have been greatly reduced. As Justice Brandeis artfully
argued in dissent,58 a more expansive view of the initial estate would
have greatly reduced the measured diminution in value. The true
value of the standing coal, he argued, must be measured against the
value of the whole property. 9 Great distortion would result if owners
were allowed to sever the fee into several pieces and then selectively
measure the economic impact against only one of the pieces.
According to Justice Brandeis, this is exactly how Justice Holmes
erred in his calculus. By isolating the unit for measurement pur-
poses as the support estate, Justice Holmes created his own mathe-
matics of diminution. Economic loss was 100% of the support estate
even though this economic loss only comprised a small percentage
of the value of the overall fee. Justice Brandeis counseled that the
sum of the rights in the parts could not be greater than the rights of
the whole.' A landowner's privileges should not be increased by her
right to divide the property into diverse interests. AsJustice Brandeis
illustrated, a landowner's prerogative to sell the air rights above the
6 See Pennsylvania Coa 260 U.S. at 416. Although the Court failed to enunciate the
boundaries of this limitation, Justice Holmes concluded that the regulation in this case went too
far. See id. at 416. By making it commercially impractical to mine, the legislation had the same
effect as appropriating the coal. See id. at 414.
SI &d. at 416.
See id. at 419-422 (Brandeis,J, dissenting).
See i. at419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'0See 41. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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surface should not modify the takings denominator.' If this were
the case, landowners could then manipulate the diminution factor
by selectively creating smaller and smaller estates. They could ma-
nipulate Justice Homes' criteria in order to compel conclusions of
takings in an ever expanding number of situations.
Pennsylvania Coal clearly demonstrates how the initial characteri-
zation of the parcel's parameters directly influences the takings
analysis.62 Definition of the denominator creates the measuring stick
for economic impact. As any mathematician will confirm, the choice
of the denominator controls the resulting quotient. To the extent
that a regulatory taking results from a diminution in value of the
property involved, the court transforms its mathematical analysis into
a jurisprudence of certainty. The economics of takings analysis
thereby is reduced to a simple refection of the mind's view of rele-
vant parcel.
III. THE TWo DIMENSIONS
Ever since Pennsylvania Coal, courts have conceptualized the tak-
ings issue primarily as a matter of diminution in value.5 However,
over the last seven decades, courts have failed to develop a clear
definition of the appropriate unit for measuring the amount of
diminution in value. The mathematics of diminution is relatively
straightforward once the relative unit of property for comparison is
established.r That the courts have for so long failed to reach a con-
sensus on this issue illustrates that hidden complexities and strong
emotions are an integral part of the regulatory takings arena.
When examining the scope of the relevant parcel, courts have
been able to choose between two distinct lines of analysis. Some
courts concentrate on the segmented nature of the parcel in ques-
tion to determine whether such segmentation can define the unit at
issue. Other courts focus on the parcel's relationship to other par-
cels in the vicinity to determine whether such a relationship should
increase the expanse of the relevant unit. These two separate and
distinct lines of inquiry reflect American culture's spatial orientation
61 See ii (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeisj.. dissenting).
See, ag. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-35 (1982)
(noting that the Court has continually found a taking in cases resulting in a permanent physical
occupation of the property, by the government or by others, without regard to whether the ac-
tion achieves an important public benefit or has only a minimal economic impact on the
owner); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1986) (finding that a regulation that prohibited
both descent and devise of property interests "went too far and was thus a taking).
"However, while the mathematics are clear once the elements are defined, the initial mat-
ter of defining the elements can be difficulL As a simple illustration: should the court concen-
trate on the "value remaining" or the "value taken"?
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toward property.65 Property exists along vertical and horizontal axes.
Our culture encourages its judges, advocates, and lay individuals to
relate to property along both axes. Land is vertically perceived as
having infinite gradations of depth and height. Land is also as a lin-
eal entity for which value is in part determined by its surroundings.
It is this affinity to view simultaneously property in a vertical and
horizontal dimension that makes the definition of a relevant parcel
so complex. The vertical inquiry in takings analysis forces courts to
decide whether segmentation of the fee should provide compensa-
ble units." The horizontal inquiry compels the courts to undertake a
takings analysis which scrutinizes the economic effects external to
the parcel itself.67 Each dimension poses special judicial issues.
A. The Vertical Dimension
In the vertical dimension, the relevant parcel is viewed colum-
nally from the depths of the earth to the heights of the sky. It com-
prises the traditional notion of the fee simple with ownership rights
extending ad coelum.68 The basic issue in vertical analysis is the de-
gree, if any, to which the court allows segmentation. Since the fee
interest can legally be divided into more discrete units that have
their own spatial and economic identity, an issue arises as to whether
the complete destruction of one of the units should comprise a regu-
latory taking. In the usual case, government regulation has caused
one segment to lose all of its economic value. The diminution is
complete within the unit, although typically, significant value con-
tinues to reside in the other parts of the fee. Therefore, the primary
issue that arises is whether vertical sectioning should define the rele-
vant unit of parcel for takings purposes.
An initial question is whether a fee owner should be permitted to
claim a complete diminution of only one "piece" of the underlying
fee. The landowner who is prevented by government legislation
See infra notes 268-282 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
6 Ad coelum comes from the Latin phrase, "cujus est solum, emus est usque ad coelum el ad inferos."
This roughly translates as, "he who owns the surface of the ground has the exclusive right to
everything which is above it and below it." This widely used concept was derived from Roman
law and applied satisfactorily so long as the activities of society remained as they were when the
rule was developed. However, once multi-storied buildings and airplanes became common, it
soon became clear that the doctrine was too restrictive. In 1946, the Supreme Court confronted
this ancient doctrine in U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946). The Court stated that the
doctrine had no place in the modem world. Emphasizing that even had Congress declared that
the air was more of a commons, the Court noted that if it were not a public highway, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. "[R]ecogniz[ing]
such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their con-
trol and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which
only the public has ajust claim." Id.
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from building too tall a skyscraper, digging too large of pit, or as-
sembling a structure too close to the lot's boundary line has lost
some value in the property, at least theoretically. The landowner's
intention to develop a pit shadows her legally recognized right to de-
velop, barring any preexisting governmental restriction to the con-
trary.' An ordinance which effectively prohibits excavation takes this
right away. There is a corresponding complete loss of that interest's
economic value. If the landowner were able to "atomize" her fee, she
could argue that the regulation was denying her the total value of
her pit. Under diminution analysis, this denial would lead a court to
conclude that the regulation constituted a takings because the result-
ing economic loss was complete.
However, if courts adopt this analysis, landowners could claim a
regulatory takings for practically every governmental interference
with their property use or value. The landowner can manipulate her
fee interest to define a denominator of decreased size but increased
significance. The whole fee can be segmented into myriad smaller
wholes; the denominator can be divided into a plethora of smaller
denominators. Such conceptual severance '0 offers the landowner a
unique strategy the landowner can separate from the whole only
those uses that are affected by the regulation and conceptually con-
strue those uses as constituting a separate whole for takings pur-
poses. The landowner can then claim that just those "pieces" are be-
ing destroyed by the government action.7'
If adopted, this policy would have far-reaching consequences.
The landowner could self-identify property units for takings pur-
poses, fractioning the fee whenever regulation threatened to impair
a use. An owner of a lucrative McDonald's franchise could argue
that the town's newly enacted building height restrictions took the
entirety of her remaining air rights (whether or not she ever in-
tended to develop them), therefore necessitating just compensation
under the takings clause.7 The owner of a rich, productive oil field
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
See MargaretJane Radin, The LiberaiConqption of Prop" : Oosas Cufm'L in theJurisprudene of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1667, 1676 (1988). Radin states that conceptual severance is a pro-
cedure that
consists of delineating a property interest consisting ofjust what the government action
has removed from the oxvner, and then asserting that particular whole thing has been
permanently taken. Thus, this strategy hypothetically or conceptually 'severs' from the
whole bundle of rightsjust those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and
then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate
whole thing.
Id.
72 See Indiana Toll Road Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 581, 193 N.E.2d 237, 240
(1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 942 (1964), and taf. dismisai 379 U.S. 487 (1965) (holding 'that
the reasonable and ordinary use of air space above land is a property right which cannot be
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could segment its surface rights and demand compensation when
the beach front property was denied a residential building permit
because of the jurisdiction's environmental concerns. Fractioniza-
tion of property interests would become the goal of every reasonable
landowner, encouraging fee simple owners to manipulate their fee
interest so as to maximize their economic gain. For example, fee
simple owners could create defeasible estates - "so long as it is used
for shopping center purposes" - if certain restrictive ordinances
were predicted.73 A moderately valuable fee could be splintered into
a column of individual segments. Compensation of each ensuing
segment could become a legal requirement.
Even if the above problem were dealt with by requiring owners to
include all segments of their fee in the denominator calculation, in-
dividuals could still easily manipulate the variables to enhance the
possibility of gaining compensation for regulatory actions. If the fee
owner transfers the segmented interest to a third party, then the
value of that party's complete property holding could be eliminated
by the legislation. A third party who purchases a bed of under-
ground quartz may be bankrupted by legislation that prevents un-
derground mining,74 even though the surface owner continues to
prosper in her use of the parcel. When the economic diminution is
visited on one individual without the reality of having counterbalanc-
ing uses on remaining segments, a new jurisprudential situation
arises. All ownership value disappears, rather than merely the total
value of one of many segments. Landowners would therefore be
counseled to sell the segments in order to maximize their value. For
those foolish enough to retain their own air rights, the city's new
height restrictions would demand no compensation. However, for
those with the foresight to sell their air rights and buy those over
someone else's fee, the height restriction would effect a total tak-
taken without the payment of compensation"); Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486,
491, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906) (stating that "space above land is real estate [and] the same as
land itself"); U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (rejecting private ownership of airspace
but recognizing a compensable taking where interference with the air rights render the benefi-
cial use of the surface land impossible). But see Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 104 (holding that air
rights alone do not constitute a separate property interest); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107
(1909) (upholding limits on the development of air rights); Griggs v. Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89
(1962) (finding an unconstitutional taking of an easement when the government used a flight
path less than 500 feet from respondent's land); Richard Kahn, Inverse Condemnation and the
Highway Cases: Compensation for Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REv. 563 (1995).
Humbach, supra note 3 at 807. ("Carried to the logical end, ordinary residential zoning
could, for example, be effectively 'busted' the simple expedient of creating fee simple deter-
minable estates limited to endure only "so long as the land is used for shopping center pur-
poses." (citation omitted).
71 See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515 (1962) (uphold-
ing a city ordinance prohibiting the rock and gravel operations on the plaintiff's property).
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img.'5 The threat of manipulation continues to dominate this juris-
prudential position. Elaborate schemes with little if any societal
benefit would saturate the land market. Rational market players
would demand segmentation for its own sake in reaction to takings
jurisprudence rather than normal market incentives.
1. Court Decisions Along the Vertical Axis
Pennsylvania Coal had fashioned the major lines of debate regard-
ing property's vertical segmentation for regulatory takings purposes.
Courts have been investigating the parameters of takings' vertical
axis ever since Pennsylvania Coal began the debate. The majority po-
sition, fashioned by Justice Holmes, presumed the ability to calculate
diminution in value by focusing on only one of many vertical seg-
ments. 6 The support estate owned by Pennsylvania Coal Company
was viewed as a whole. If the ability to mine was restricted, a total
diminution of the support estate would follow. The coal company
owned only this "piece." Consequently, the regulation deprived the
owner of all value of its segment. For Justice Holmes, this was suffi-
cient to find a regulatory takings in the case. Brandeis, however,
counseled that value calculation had to be based on the entire verti-
cal dimension.7 Even though individuals could legally separate the
fee into an infinite number of parts, value calculation could not be
likewise segmented. Diminution had to be judged within the con-
text of the entire fee, otherwise the calculus would be distorted and
the hostage of rampant manipulation.
Courts, however, did little to expand this analysis over the next
fifty years. Most regulatory takings cases during this period assumed
the totality of the parcel and arguments regarding economic destruc-
tion of only one of several segments found little audience.m The
Rubenfeld, supra note 36, at 1107 (explaining that if 'A' deeds to B the right to exclude
cable television equipment from her property, and State X' passes a mandatory installation law,
'B' might be entitled to compensation under Lucas even though 'A' might not be entitled to
compensation under Loreo).
'6 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
'7 See id. at 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
Gmpare Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that there vas a taking when the
company could not mine because the whole of what the company owned was the mining rights)
with Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding that there %as no taking by
statute that destroyed plaintiffs right to use the land as a quarry even though plaintiff owned
both the piece of land and the right to use the land as a quarry because the right to mine was
merely part of the entire property right). Godblatt is one of the rare exceptions to the Court's
general refusal to enter the takings arena after Pennsylvania Coal.
State courts generally followed the reasoning of Penn Central, allowing restrictions that de-
stroyed only a part of a property right. See also Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans., 84 F.2d 755 (1936).
cert denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937) (holding that there was no right to injunctive relief to stop
planes from passing through the air space over plaintiffs property because there was no dem-
onstration of economic loss or harm in the whole of the property.); Multnomah County v. How-
ell, 496 P.2d 235 (Or. C. App. 1972) (holding that a zoning ordinance that applies to only a
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widespread landmark and environmental legislation of the late six-
ties and early seventies, 9 however, forced the Court to renew its dis-
cussion of the vertical plane. The new aesthetic and conservationist
legislation characteristically burdened only a part of the entire fee
interest. Although the parcel maintained several uses, the regulated
segment often lost its economic feasibility. This onslaught of legisla-
tion placed increased pressure on landowners and set the stage for a
revisiting of takings doctrine.0 It would be the architectural designs
of famed architect Frans Boehm"' which provided the basis for the
portion of a landowner's land does not amount to a taking); Sibson v. New Hampshire, 336 A.2d
239 (1975) (holding that marshland protection law preventing the filling of plaintiff's land was
a proper exercise of police power and was not a taking merely because a part of plaintiff's land
could not be used in a particular way).
See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)); Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA), Pub. L. 23-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.CA. §§ 1531-1543);
National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 93-378, 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. §§1600-1614) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)); Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.CA. § 651 (1970); Coastal Zone Management Act, Pub. L. 91-224,
81 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.CA. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1985 & Supp.
1997)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), Pub. L. 92-137, 85
Stat. 379, Pub. L. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§1251-1376
(retitled the Clean Water Act in 1977) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)); National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4321 (West 1994)); Clean Air Act (CAA), Pub. L. 80-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 1995)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, Pub. L. 89-72, 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §6901
(West 1985 & Supp. 1997)); California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB. REs.
CODE §§ 21000- 21194 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); Michigan Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1970).
Around 1970, there was a remarkable resurgence of regulatory reform activity which re-
shaped the federal regulatory system. Although the major preoccupations of the period are
clear-an upsurge of interest in health, safety, and conservation issues-it is anything but self-
evident why these concerns emerged precisely when they did. Robert Rabins infers that tile
Vietnam War and the book, SILENT SPRING, by Rachel Carson, could have had some influence.
He terms this period the "Public Interest Era." See Robert L. Rabins, Federal Regulation in Histori-
calPerspective, 38 STAN L. REV. 1189, 1278-95 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (1986).
See supra at note 79.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-117. The Court stated that:
Two separate plans, both designed by architect Marcel Breuer and both apparently satis-
fying the terms of the applicable zoning ordinance, were submitted to the Commission
for approval. The first, Breuer I, provided for the construction of a 55-story office build-
ing, to be cantilevered above the existing facade and to rest on the roof of the Terminal.
The second, Breuer II Revised, called for tearing down a portion of the Terminal that in-
cluded the 42nd Street facade, stripping off some of the remaining features of the Ter-
minal's facade, and constructing a 53-story office building. (footnote omitted)
See generally David Lasker, Around Home Wassily Chair, LA. TIMES, May 21, 1989, at 44C (reveal-
ing that in 1925 Marcel Breuer, at the age 24, was the head of the furniture workshop at the
Bauhaus design school in Dessau, Germany, and that Breuer invented the Wassily chair); David
Lasker, Around Home Notes on Southwest Dishes, Wood Turning and Cesca Chairs Breuer's Cesca Chair,
LA. TIMES, June 10, 1988, at 44F (reporting that Hungarian-born Marcel Breuer (1902-1981) is
the brainchild of the Cesca chair which ranks among the century's most familiar designs)
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Supreme Court's reevaluation of its takings doctrine in Penn Central
Transportation. Co. v. City of New York.2
In the congestion of many urban habitats, space is maximized by
building upwardss Constrained by the limits of downtown geogra-
phy, development proceeds vertically and value becomes concen-
trated in the architecture of skyscrapers. Given the urban topogra-
phy of New York City, it therefore was not unusual for air rights to
comprise the major part of a lot's value. When Penn Central Trans-
portation Company attempted to profit by building a 50-story office
building in its vacant space above New York City's Grand Central Sta-
tion,ss it was merely attempting to exploit its most valuable vertical
segment.' Denial of its development plan by the Landmarks Preser-
vation Commission led to the owner's suit charging, inter alia, that
the application of the city's preservation law constituted a taking of
its property.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated that owners could
not establish a "taking" merely by showing that they had been denied
the right to exploit the airspace above their property.8' In deciding
whether a particular regulation effects a taking, courts must focus on
"the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole."ss While the Court accepted the company's argument that
the Landmarks Law had deprived the company of gainful use of air
rights above the terminal, the Court expressly rejected the notion
that it should find a takings irrespective of the value of the remain-
der of the company's parcel. Regulatory takings are not established
merely by showing that an owner is denied the ability to exploit one
of several property interests available for development. Brennan
ended the vertical debate with one simple declaration: "'Taking' ju-
risprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
Manuela Hoelterhoff, Death by Design- How to Murder a Monument, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1986
(noting that Marcel Breuer was Penn Central's architect and he was amazed that anyone should
object to anything he designed or might wish to do).
' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116 n.16.
83 As cities become more urbanized, space becomes more and more scarce resulting in an
architecture which builds upward rather than outward. Consequently, air rights become more
valuable in the city where there is less land on which to build.
s' Penn Central 438 U.S. at 116 ("On January 22, 1968... Penn Central ... entered into a
renewable 50-year lease and sublease agreement with.. . UGP Properties, Inc. ... Under the
terms of the agreement, UGP was to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal.
UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1 million annually during construction and at least $3 mil-
lion annually thereafter.").
5Id. at 142 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Before the city of NewYork declared Grand Central
Terminal to be a landmark, Penn Central could have used its 'air rights' over the Terminal to
build a multistory office building, at an apparent value of several million dollars per year.').
Seeid- at 118-19.
SId. at 130.
" Id. at 130-31.
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and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated."8 9
The majority explicitly stressed that there is little precedent for
vertical piecemealing. Previously, the Court had upheld a number of
laws that had completely restricted the development of one segment
of an owner's fee." The Court noted that such case precedent
should dispose of any contention that segmentation of takings
claims could be based on Pennsylvania Coal 9 For the majority, the
diminution of value had to be measured against the value of the en-
tire parcel, here, the fee comprising the city tax block.12  The su-
peradjacent airspace could not be viewed in isolation; the remainder
of the company's property interests must be included in the de-
nominator.
A decade later, the Court clearly and emphatically reiterated its
position regarding the vertical denominator. Faced with the fact that
twenty-seven million tons of coal were required to be left in thirteen
mines as a result of the 1986 Pennsylvania Mine Subsidence Act,93 an
association of coal companies filed suit arguing that the state had ef-
fectively appropriated the coal since there was no other useful pur-
pose to the coal if it were not mined.Y The association emphasized
that the Act completely destroyed the value of their support estate, a
legally recognized, separate and distinct property interest under
Id at 130.
See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (holding that placing zoning restrictions on
building height which discriminated based on the residential or commercial classification of the
city section in which Welch wanted to build was "reasonable and justified by the police power");
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962) (holding that ordinance which
prohibited excavation below the water table which had the effect of confiscating Goldblatt's
sand and gravel mining business was not an unconstitutional taking, while acknowledging that
some government regulation can be "so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally
requires compensation"); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604, 608-610 (1987) (holding that a set-
back ordinance which created a building line which must be "as far from the street as that occu-
pied by 60% of the existing houses in the block," was constitutional because city councils are
"better qualified than the courts to determine the necessity, character and degree of regula-
tion").
" See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 n.27 (explaining cases which disposed of the Pennsylvania
Coal view that "full use of air rights is so bound up with the investment-backed expectations of
appellants that governmental deprivation of these rights... irrespective of the.., value of the
parcel as a whole-constitutes a 'taking'").
Id. at 130-131.
Pennsylvania Bituminous Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §1406.1 (West 19xx) (the Act was established to (1) conserve land area (2) protect the
public (3) enhance the value of surface lands (4) aid in providing surface water drainage and
public water supplies (5) improve the use and enjoyment of surface lands and (6) maintain
primary jurisdiction over surface coal mining in Pennsylvania.); Id. at §§ 1406.2, .2 (§1406.5 of
the Act requires all bituminous coal mines subject to the Act to apply for a permit before they
open, reopen or continue operating their mine); see also Burns v. Consol. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
636 A.2d 642, 647 (Pa. Super. 1994).
See Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1986).
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Pennsylvania law.9' The Supreme Court's response was direct: "27
million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of prop-
erty for takings law purposes."" The Court stressed that takings ju-
risprudence demanded economic evaluation be assessed against the
entire parcel at issue, rather than against one piece of the whole.
The majority pointed out that many zoning ordinances placed limits
on an owner's right to make profitable use of one or more segments
of the property; however, if profitable use can be made of the parcel
as a whole, then there exists no basis for claiming a Fifth Amend-
ment violation.
97
In its Keystone decision, the Court repeatedly underscored its re-
solve that segmented interests should not furnish the denominator
of the takings fraction.98 Neither the uniqueness of Pennsylvania
property law in regarding the support estate as a separate property
interest nor the enormity of the coal companies' projected loss gave
the Court cause to digress from its established principle. Indeed, the
Court seemed to reject squarely Justice Holmes' conclusions in Penn-
sylvania Coato° and adopt Brandeis' position regarding parcel iden-
tity. There was no takings of economic viability since the right to
mine the support estate constituted only a fraction of the total value
of the companies' mining rights. As the majority pointed out, Su-
preme Court jurisprudence since 1922 had strictly maintained the
principle of nonsegmentation.
Significantly, the majority decision was forwarded in the face of a
vigorous dissent. Rehnquist, writing for the dissenters, criticized the
majority's broad definition of the relevant mass of property, a defini-
tion which allowed it "to ascribe to the Subsidence Act a less perni-
cious effect on the interests of the property owner,"'O' and its refusal
See id at 500 ("Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique in regarding the support
estate as a separate interest in land that can be conveyed apart from either the mineral estate or
the surface estate .. . .") Despite Pennsylvania's legal recognition of the support estate as a
separate property interest, it could not be used profitably by one who does not also possess ei-
ther the mineral estate or the surface estate.
" Idat 498.
Id at508.
See id at 496 (relating petitioners description of the effect that the Subsidence Act had
from 1966-1982 on 13 of the mines that the petitioners operate, and claims that they have been
required to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place).
'® But seeJohn E. Fee, Comment, Uneahzing the Denominator in Rtgulatoiy Taking lairas, 61 U.
CHI. L REv. 1535, 1541 & nn.33-34 (1994) (arguing that the Court did not expressly overrule
Pennsylvania Coal, rather it distinguished that case on two grounds: "First, the legislation in Penn-
sylvania Coal-was a private benefit statute, whereas the regulations in Keystone were issued for the
public benefit. ... Second, the DER regulations did not make the mining of 'certain coal'
commercially impracticable as the earlier law had done').
' Kestone, 480 U.S. at 514 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
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to evaluate the Act's impact against the support estate alone.102 With
the two positions so clearly delineated, the majority's ruling gained
increased prominence. Conceptual severance and vertically frac-
tionated interests were removed from takings analysis. There could
be no doubt that by firmly cementing the principle of nonsegmenta-
ion in Keystone, the Supreme Court acknowledged nonsegmentation
as the law of the land.
2. Status and Policy Implications of the Vertical Dimension
The issue of the vertical dimension has been resolved. The view
recognizing division of the aggregate into discrete segments of indi-
vidualized value has been replaced by the demand to view the parcel"as a whole." Whatever other definition one gives to a parcel's"complete package," it is clear that, for takings purposes, diminution
calculus cannot focus solely on separate strips of the vertical bundle.
Subsurface, surface, and air rights together comprise the economic
whole against which the effects of regulation must be measured.
This rule is readily understood, finds simple application, and leads to
efficient management of land. Any other approach would invite in-
ventive severance of unified parcels as well as widespread manipula-
tion of property interests. Economic, judicial, and administrative
costs would rise and market efficiency would likely fall. Most impor-
tantly, however, the nonsegmentation rule diminishes the threat of
rampant takings challenges for much of today's needed preservation-
ist and environmental legislation. Theories of negative servitudes
and special estates disappear in the vertical landscape. The govern-
ment is freed to base its decision making on aggregate costs and
benefits, just as individual landowners traditionally do with their par-
cels.
B. The Horizontal Dimension
In the horizontal dimension, the relevant parcel is viewed line-
arly. Rather than the height and depth orientation of the vertical
dimension, ' parcels are evaluated in terms of length and width.Central to the focus of horizontal analysis are the spatial borders of
" See id. at 517-520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating in opposition to the majority opinion
that:
The regulation... does not merely inhibit one strand in the bundle.., but instead de-
stroys completely any interest in a segment of property. I would hold that the Act works
a taking. I see no reason for refusing to evaluate the impact of the Subsidence Act on
the support estate alone, for Pennsylvania has clearly defined it as a separate estate in
property... [Wihere the estate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its
own right, it is appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that particular prop-
erty interest.
Id at 518-20.
' See supra notes 72-77.
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the property at issue, including, at times, the boundaries of other
land interests in the area. Land is envisioned as an expanse of lineal
square feet. The main issue is to determine which specific square
footage area should be examined for takings purposes.
Ascertaining the horizontal dimension presents one of the most
vexing problems in takings jurisprudence. Parcel valuation is not
neatly contained within the meridian lines of a jurisdiction's tax
maps. Lots vary in size and topography. Larger parcels can be, and
frequently are, subdivided into smaller parcels. Any given parcel may
have particular areas that offer special opportunities for exploitation
or areas that are uniquely sensitized to various forms of develop-
ment. In addition, a lot can gain most of its economic value not
from its inherent characteristics, but from the nature and worth of
the surrounding lands. Neighborhoods and contiguous parcels of-
ten underlie the real value of a given tract.
The determination of the "identifiable and separable property in-
terest" worthy of Fifth Amendment protection'" has therefore led a
chartered history along the horizontal plane." While simplicity
might counsel a definition designated by the lot lines of the parcel
being regulated, notions of fairness and justice have caused such
metes and bounds parceling to be suspect.'" Any responsible de-
termination of a regulation's economic impact requires the evaluator
to ascertain the nature and extent of the parcel affected. Value can
be derived from beyond the physical boundaries of the property in-
terest; and value can be unequally distributed within an existing lot.
Calculation of the takings denominator consequently demands a
firm understanding of the horizontal variable.
The horizontal dimension can be viewed and evaluated in a
number of different manners. A plethora of variables exist along the
horizontal axis that can have an impact on the valuation of a parcel.
Parcels can vary in size from a few square feet to several square miles.
Lush timber can inhabit one comer of a tract and swampy wetlands
another. An owner can employ the property in an integrated use
with a contiguous lot or chronologically subdivide the parcel into a
number of smaller units over a long period of time. Liquor stores
can open down the street and devalue the plot. Sharing a boundary
with a state or national park can insure a heightened value for gen-
erations. It is this web of variables and the interrelationships that ex-
ist among them that pose the greatest challenge to decision makers.
The sorting of significant factors and the ranking in a monetary hi-
10 See Kestone, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
' See supra notes 128-138 and accompan)ing text.
'0 Seegeneraly Schleich, supra note 3; Humbach, supra note 3; Fee, supra note 101.
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erarchy is not a simple task.'l° A variety of yardsticks have been em-
ployed by a variety of courts. Finding the horizontal parameters of
the takings equation has proved to be one of the more elusive quests
that courts have engaged in during the past century.
Significantly, both the spatial and temporal axes of the horizontal
dimension provide variables for consideration. Each axis influences
the other and opens jurisprudential issues that escape scrutiny when
one axis is viewed in isolation. An individual's economic investment
in and reasonable investment-backed expectations for a parcel' 8 may
be inadequately represented by concentrating on present market
value. The individual's complete ownership history - including
what, how, and when the owner subdivided, used, hypothecated, or
improved the parcel - provides information that is central to un-
derstanding the owner's particular relationship to the land. To the
extent that takings jurisprudence is concerned with notions ofjustice
and fairness this individualized history becomes pivotal. Instead of
merely looking at the current economic impact that the regulation
has on the metes and bounds description of the fee contained in the
owner's grant deed, additional factors are often considered. Courts
have typically considered parcel contiguity and unity of use and own-
ership as consequential. Various courts have likewise found it "un-
fair" to designate a denominator without considering, inter alia, the
degree to which the particular property is an identifiable property
interest,'09 the economic viability of the particular property interest
'07 A rudimentary example can highlight the complexities. An individual owns three ten acre
parcels in one municipality. One ten acre parcel, now currently worth $50,000, was purchased
ten years ago for $10,000. It is contiguous to the old town square and is yet to be developed.
The second and third ten acre parcels are across town and were purchased two years ago for
$10,000 each. The second parcel was subdivided by the individual into two five acre lots; the
western five acre lot was recently sold for $20,000. The individual has developed his remaining
five acre interest into an office park. His plans to enlarge this development by building on his
contiguous ten acre tract have been defeated by wetland designation of five acres of this re-
maining parcel. When the individual challenges this legislation as a regulatory takings, how
should the court view the relevant parcel for diminution analysis? Should it consider the rele-
vant unit as only the five acre portion designated as wetland? Should valuation analysis look at
use and value of the entire ten acre expanse of the third lot? Should the economic calculus
extend to the contiguous five acre parcel that has been developed or consider the earlier conti-
guity of the entire ten acres of the second parcel? Should it add into the mathematics the
$20,000 profit from the subdivided portion of the second plot? Should the valuation of the first
parcel or its appreciation over the last ten years form part of the takings denominator? Such
questions have plagued the takings debate.
' See Schleich, supra note 3, at 388 (noting that it is the economic value of the property
"owner's anticipated or current use of the property with the property's economic value as af-
fected by the regulation").
'09 See Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993) (rejecting attempt to divide the property into what was taken
and what was left).
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under state lav,"0 the terms of the original purchase,"' the history of
the treatment of the parcel,"2 the unity of use within and outside the
parcel,"3 or the physical characteristics or natural boundaries of the
lot."4 Concern for a just result has consequently splintered the no-
tion of a takings denominator into a myriad of constructions. To
date, courts have failed to agree on how to weigh these variables or
even which should be considered."5
1. Court Decisions Along the Horizontal Axis
For the first several decades of takings analysis following Pennsyl-
vania Coa4 there was little judicial focus on the horizontal dimen-
sion. The Brandeis-Holmes debate had revolved around the vertical
plane and the ability to sever the subsurface coal rights from the
fee."6 While Brandeis' writings could be expansively interpreted to
apply to the horizontal dimension, 7 the limited factual setting of
the case channeled most of the ensuing debate into issues of vertical
segmentation."8 Although diminution in value had become a cen-
tral element in takings analysis, diminution was most often character-
ized in terms of lost subsoil or air rights rather than in terms of re-
110 SeePennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393,414-15 (1922).
. See Florida v. Schindler, 604 So. 2d 565, 567-68 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992). r iei denie, 613
So. 2d 8 (1992) (holding that the relevant unit was the entire 3.5 acre parcel where 1.85 acres
was precluded from development since the owner purchased the entire parcel with full knowl-
edge that only a portion would be buildable, based in part on the historic treatment of the par-
cel as a single unit); Thompson v. Village of Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d 1227, 1245 (1993) (explain-
ing that the entire parcel was purchased as a single unit at one time, the court treated the
entire parcel as the relevant unit for measuring taking).
"' See Kaiser Dev. Co. v. Honolulu, 649 F.Supp. 926, 947 (D. Ha-aii 1986), emf. dried, 499
U.S. 947 (1991) (considering how the land was/is treated by the owner is one of the factors to
be considered by the court in determining the relevant parcel); Ciampiui u. United Staes, 22 CI.
Ct. 310, 318 (placing emphasis on the fact that owner purchased and financed the 45 acres as a
single parcel, as the owner, at the time of purchase saw the parcels as inextricably linked).
" Ciampiti, 22 Cl. C. at 318 (identifying among the factors for determining the relevant
parcel, the "degree of continuity, date of acquisition, extent to which the parcel has been
treated as a single unit, [and] the extent to which the protected lands enhance the value of
remaining lands").114 See id.
"5 See infraat note 124.
11 See supra at notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
117 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (-Te rights of an owner
as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface and
subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not be greater than tie rights in the whole.'): see
also Fee, supra note 100, at 1552. Fee notes that:
Although the issue in Pennsylvania Coal involved a vertical division of land, the problem
identified byJustice Brandies is no different in the horizontal context. If an owner can-
not limit the power of the state by selling his air or underground rights, why should he be
able to do so by selling horizontally adjacent property riglts?
Ie.
11s Pennsylvania Coal provided little insight into how and when a regulation would go "too far"
under the Fifth Amendment. See Humbach, supra note 3, at 777-78 & nn. 31, 34.
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strictions along the surface fee itself. When Penn Central reawakened
the Court to the takings question, it too investigated the geography
of vertical economics.
Early cases had muffled the impact of horizontal analysis. Begin-
ning with Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'2 the Supreme Court consis-
tently reinforced the view that zoning regulation was not in itself a
takings. An owner's individual goals for the parcel could be severely
curtailed by land use restrictions. Comprehensive zoning laws that
prescribed, inter alia, the extent of a lot's area that must be left open
for light and air or in aid of fire protection gained constitutional le-
gitimacy. 12' Likewise, usage constraints that had an overwhelming
impact on the economic viability of the tract were unfailingly held to
be valid." Diminutions in value as high as ninety percent2s were
sanctioned by police power notions of progress and social necessity
and by the elastic judicial concept of reciprocity of advantage." '
Even when a regulation denied a higher or best use, Justice Holmes'
"too far" line would not be crossed if sufficient value remained.
Courts measured the value of an owner's holding within the parame-
ter of the entire surface square footage. Denial of a particular usage
on one part of the whole became universally accepted.
Total denial of use or economic benefit on one part of a lot's sur-
face whole likewise received early judicial acceptance. Most ordi-
nances limited the range of uses that an owner could develop on a
parcel, without completely closing the owner's development window.
However, setback ordinances entirely abolished an owner's ability to
build over certain portions of the owner's land. An owner's right to
develop these particular strips of property was totally eliminated.
These "no building zones" frustrated many investment-backed ex-
pectations and diminution arguments seemed ripe. But as early as
1927, the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of building setback
"' See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 130-131 (1978); see also
Schleich, supra note 3.
'0 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
121 Id.
' See, e.g., id.; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
..3 See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 414 (allowing as constitutional a regulation which resulted in
diminution of property value from $800,000 to $60,000).
"' See generally Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a
New Theory of TakingsJurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990); Glass, supra note 3; Levitt, su-
pra note 26; Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sorting Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Counci, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 615 (1993); Laitos, supra note 3; Buck, supra
note 3; Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Takings
Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use, ""Average Reciprocity of Advantage, "and "Bundle of Rights"from
Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVrL. Ar. L. REv. 653 (1987).
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requirements in Gorieb v. Fox.'2 All courts have unfailingly continued
to do so ever since.
It was not until the 1970's that the boundaries of the horizontal
dimension began to be actively and consistently explored. The
shrinking viability of the vertical segmentation argument and the in-
crease in wetland and other governmental regulation likely drove the
calculus of takings into investigation of the horizontal domain.
However, whatever the cause of the increased focus, courts through-
out the country were beginning to be besieged with takings chal-
lenges based on a regulation's limitation of only one portion of an
owner's total surface area holding.
Two cases involving wetlands regulation that deprived the land-
owner of all practical use of a portion of the owner's larger tract
demonstrated such challenges. In both cases, environmental restric-
tions forced a portion of each parcel to remain vacant and economi-
cally unproductive. In American Dredging Co. v. State of New Jersey and
Dept. of EnvtL Protection2 6 wetland restrictions on a 2500 acre tract
prevented all practical use of eighty acres of the total area. The
landowner claimed that such restrictions were a complete diminu-
tion in value of the subject eighty acres and declared that its land
had been taken by the regulations.'" Similarly, the landowner in
Jentgen v. United States2s found that federal regulations prevented him
from developing more than forty acres of the 101 acre tract he had
purchased. The implication forJentgen was that he could no longer
pursue his dream to build a water-oriented residential community on
his tract. Jentgen brought suit alleging that he had suffered an un-
compensated taking.
For both owners, government ordinances imprisoned their do-
minion and devalued their property interest. They each had lost any
real possibility of developing the regulated segments that comprised
substantial pieces of their overall holdings. If they could convince
the courts to define the relevant parcel as the eighty or forty acre
portions refused dredge and fill permits, then the courts would be
forced to find a Fifth Amendment takings under diminution anal)-
sis. If minimum lot size were used as a reference point, it was, in
each case, equivalent to the government preventing any building
upon, and therefore taking all value from, more than a hundred sin-
gle-family residential lots. When scrutinized as a conglomeration of
singular small units, the numerator and denominator of the takings
equation mirrored each other.
12 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
-' 169 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 18 (1979).
117 Seeid. at43.
'2 657 F.2d 1210 (1981).
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American Dredging and Jentgen each demonstrated the potential
lurking within the definitional parameters of the horizontal dimen-
sion. Segmentation along the horizontal plane could force a takings
result under diminution analysis. Each of these courts was directly
faced with the issue of how to measure the relevant parcel for takings
purposes, and each was directly challenged by the landowners in-
volved to rule within the demands of 'Justice and fairness." Signifi-
cantly, both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Claims denied the landowners any relief. Underlying each
decision was a consistent definition of the relevant parcel. The hold-
ing in Penn Central that parcels must be viewed as a whole was fully
applicable.' The controlling fact for the NewJersey Supreme Court
was that American Dredging had originally purchased a 2500-acre
tract. This purchase was a single unit of ownership and was, for the
court, the relevant piece to serve as the takings denominator.'
When the tract was viewed in its entirety, the restricted eighty acre
section comprised only three percent of the area. Little use or value
decline was evident. Correspondingly, the United States Court of
Claims refused Jentgen's invitation to view the relevant parcel as any-
thing other than the 101 acre tract originally purchased. Since Jent-
gen could still develop forty of this total 101 acres, no unconstitu-
tional regulation had been applied. Use of his property was still
economically viable when scrutinized as a 101 acre whole. For the
court, the case "merely presents an instance of some diminution in
value, or frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations,
stemming from changes in applicable statutes and regulations .... "51
American Dredging and Jentgen demonstrate then the emerging re-
luctance of courts to sever horizontally property interests. When
land was purchased at one time, the totality of that purchase defined
the relevant parcel. Diminution in value was judged against the en-
tire original acquisition, rather than only the specific area subjected
to the regulation or the area remaining in ownership at the time of
the regulation. Courts continued to emphasize the Supreme Court's
admonition in Penn Central that "taking jurisprudence does not di-
vide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated.., this Court focuses rather.., on the nature and extent of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."" 2 Although the
' See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 ("'Taking'jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated... this Court focuses... on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole .... ).
See American Dredging, 404 A.2d at 43.
SeeJentgen, 657 F.2d at 1214.
" Penn Central 438 U.S. at 130-13 1.
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facts of Penn Central made this language clearly applicable only to
vertical segmentation,-" the phrase "parcel as a whole" was consis-
tently construed to encompass the entire physical breadth of the
tract originally purchased.
In case after case,'4 courts throughout the country refused to
limit the takings denominator to just the regulated portion of land
or to the reduced size of the tract at the time of the restriction's ap-
plication. The proper point of reference for diminution analysis was
assumed to be the entire ownership interest as it existed at the time
of purchase. Many courts invoked this rationale, finding additional
support in the Supreme Court's dicta in Andrus v. Allard." Once
again, the Court had admonished the lower courts that "the destruc-
tion of one strand of the bundle is not a taking because the aggre-
gate must be viewed in its entirety. "" "Aggregate" and "parcel as a
whole" became the terms of choice used by the courts to expansively
define the takings denominator.
The United States Court of Claims again looked to the original
purchase as the defining parcel unit in Deltona Corp. v. United States,'"
framing its analysis around the developer's initial 10,000 acre acqui-
sition in 1965 rather than the much smaller area remaining to be de-
veloped at the time of the regulation's imposition in 1973. ' "s In
1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
MacLeod v. Santa Clara County," ruled that the denial of the right to
use a sizable portion of a single 7000 acre parcel for timber harvest-
See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
1 See Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Delhona Corp.
v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. CL. 1981), cert. denie, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Campitti v. v.
United States, 22 CL. Ct. 310 (1991); Jenlgen, 657 F.2d 1210; Arnerican Dirdging, 404 A.2d 42;
MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. US., 10
F.3d 796 (Ct. App. 1993); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Ber-
nardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 129 N.J. 221, 608 A.2d 1377 (1992); Thomp-
son, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d 1227 (1993); Bevan v. Brandon Township, 438 Mfich.
385,475 N.W.2d 37 (Michie 1991); Kelly v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 109 Nev. 638. 855
P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1993), cat denied, 62 U.S.LW. 3442 (1994).
SeeAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
3 Id. at 65-66 (questioning whether the Migratory Bird Treaty Act effected a taking upon the
plaintiff by denying them the right to sell feathers. The court found the denial of the right to
sell the feathers was not a taking since the owners retained the rights to possess and transport
their property and to donate or devise the protected feathers).
13 657 F.2d 1184 (1981).
13 See id. at 1188-89. In 1964 Deltona purchased an undeveloped 10,000 acre parcel, for
$7,500,000, on the Florida Gulf coast with the intention of developing Marco Island, a wuter-
oriented residential community. This required considerable dredging and filling, as well as the
permanent destruction of much of the natural vegetation. Because Deltona's proposed dredge
and fill activities were to take place in navigable water of the U.S., it was required to obtain the
proper permit from the Army Corps before any of the work could legally get undernay. Del-
tona's problems culminated in a lawsuit stemming from its inability to obtain all the permits
which it needed to complete its project. Id
'" 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
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ing purposes - the only viable use on that portion of the land -
did not effect a taking since diminution in value must be scaled
against the entire original tract.4 ' The court directly rejected the
owner's contention that denial of the use of this smaller portion of
the whole was so bound up with the investment-backed expectations
that such government deprivation of the use would constitute a tak-
ing.14' As the court stated, "it is well settled that taking jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments or attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment of a larger parcel
have been entirely abrogated."
4
Correspondingly, when the Town of Moraga enacted an open-
space ordinance that restricted development of the ridgeline areas of
a developer's property,4 1 the District Court for the Northern District
of California emphasized the fact "that 'taking' analysis does not
permit a landowner to parse up his property in order to make a
claim." 44 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Washington directly re-
buked a landowner's assertion that wetland designation of one-third
of its 4.5 acre parcel constituted a taking of this portion, which un-
der the regulation had to remain undeveloped. 145 The justices noted
that "neither state nor federal law has divided property into smaller
segments of an undivided parcel... to inquire whether a piece of it
has been taken ."' " And when a New Jersey landowner contended
that the "parcel as a whole" consisted of only those fourteen acres of
lots for which a federal permit had been requested and denied, the
United States Court of Claims reinforced its earlier decisions by
holding that the entire forty-five acre purchase had to be considered
in determining whether the owner had been deprived of all eco-
nomically viable use. 47
' See id. at 549 ("[E]xisting authority [within the Court] compels us to reject MacLeod's
contention that the denial of the right to use a portion of a parcel of property invariably consti.
tutes a taking, irrespective diminution of value, or denial of the highest and best use of prop-
erty."); see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (determining
whether or not an economically viable use of property remains is an ad hoc fact based inquiry);
see also MacLeod v. County of Santa Clam, 749 F.2d 541, 549 ("The denial of [MacLeod's per-
mit] merely prohibited an additional expected use of the property. This is not enough to allow
us to conclude that it interfered with MacLeod's investment-backed expectations, extinguished
a fundamental attribute of ownership, or prevented MacLeod from deriving a reasonable return
on the property.").
.4 See id., 749 F.2d at 547.
14 Id.
143 See Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
114 It at 1204.
14 Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
"6 Id. at 334 (noting that the court overruled a state court case in which the court looked to
only a portion of the regulated property as the law does not permit such division of a parcel into
smaller units for the purpose of a taking analysis).
117 Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (treating the relevant parcel to be the
entire 45 acre purchase rather than the 14 acres subject to a wetlands restriction). The court
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2. Status and Policy Implications of the Horizontal Dimension
Courts throughout the country have embraced this vision of the
relevant parcel, with few exceptions.' Where contiguous acreage is
purchased at one time, the entire acreage is considered as a single
unit of ownership for regulatory takings analysis. Even though some
portions of the unit are later forced to remain vacant and economi-
cally unproductive due to governmental restrictions, the takings de-
nominator continues to be the original tract. Courts have consis-
tently denied an owner the option of identifying the relevant interest
solely as the regulated portion, notwithstanding the fact that the
regulation applies to subdivided lots," 9 lots of differing physical con-
figuration,' separate tax lots,' 5' multiple use lots, "2 or the final lots
of a development scheme facing a zoning reclassification. '
This analytical position provides clear jurisprudential advantages.
It is a rule that leads to certainty and exactitude when applied since
the denominator is precisely demarcated. Diminution analysis is
performed against the relevant parcel of the original purchase, the
metes and bounds of which have a factual security unparalleled by
other jurisprudential theories." Since the jurist deals with only a
single instant of time, confusing operations of subtraction and addi-
tion (of contiguous land mass that the owner either purchases or
sells off at a later period of time) are avoided. The low administra-
tive costs associated with the predictability of this rule would also
noted that Ciampitti treated the whole 45 acres as one parcel for purpose of purchase and fi-
nancing. Id at 320.
'4 See infraat notes 178-191 and accompanying text.
'4 See Kelly v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027. 1035 (Nev. 1993) (ruling
that there was no taling where four out of 39 of Kelly's subdivided lots vere precluded from
development).
"0 See State Dep't of Env't Regulation v. Schindler, 604 So.2d 565. 568 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1992) (refusing to view 1.85 acres of a 3.5 acre parcel as separate merely because the land u-n
submerged). The court noted that the property had always been considered one unit even
though only part of it was submerged. Id.
. See Bevan v. Brandon Township, 375 N..2d 37 (holding that two lots which were pur-
chased at different times by plaintiff, and which carried separate tax identification numbers,
were not considered separate parcels for takings analysis). The court noted that "-[artificial
device[s],' such as tax identification numbers and separate deeds... are not controlling in de-
termining whether enforcement of the ordinance in this case would amount to a taking." Id. at
397.
See Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsille, 608 A.2d 1377, 1389 (upholding an
ordinance which limited the depth to which land could be quarried). The court noted that the
property could be put to a variety of other uses which the ordinance would not effect and would
be of value to plaintiff. Id. at 242.
See Thompson v. Village of Hinsdale, 617 N.F2d 1227 (1993) (den)ing a takings claim
even though the parcel had been subdivided into 3 separate lots and a new zoning ordinance
would not allow development of one of the lots). The court reasoned that plaintiff still had an
economic viable use of the property;, he could build on two of the lots. Id. at 886.
. See Shleich, supra note 3.
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generate favorable market pressures. If the original purchase de-
fines takings' relevant parcel, the investor can then calculate with
some exactitude the parameters of potential regulatory action. The
purchase itself would provide notice to the investor of the scope of
regulatory loss"s that is possible at that time and at each interval
thereafter.9'6 Notions of justice and fairness, which so preoccupy
many courts in this situation," ' also receive due consideration under
this legal position. Cries of unfair treatment are muffled to the ex-
tent that an owner gains a value, or realizes an overall profit, from
the initial investment. The developer who made a considerable
windfall from the beginning phases of her development can be
viewed as having less of an ethical foundation for complaining
merely because she is precluded from building on ten remaining
wetland acres.
Neither federal nor state law has ever guaranteed the free use and
economic viability of each square foot of land from the moment of
acquisition until the moment of sale. Indeed, countess decisions
have emphatically reiterated the legal doctrine that an owner is not
constitutionally entitled to the highest and best use of the prop-
erty.58  Besides being an advantaged player in the free market sys-
tem, 59 the owner likely received numerous governmental benefits
from the original purchase itself, including favorable tax incentives,
the implicit value of a surrounding regulated environment, and the
advantages of living in a civilized community.' 60 Reciprocity there-
155 Under diminution analysis, investors must note that high decreases in value are normally
required to claim a regulatory takings under Holmesian mathematics. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1019 n.8 (recognizing that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing);
see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (allowing regulation resulting in 87.5%
diminution in property value); Jentgen v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1210 (finding no taking even though
owner could only develop 40 acres out of 101 acres).
15 See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatoiy Takings: Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 URB. LAW. 389,
410 & n.137 (1988).
157 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 1994); Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construc-
tion Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hemstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Ct. Cl. 1986); Deltona v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37 (S. Ct. 1991);
see also Buck, supra note 3, at 1310 n.197 (highlighting such cases as Pennell v. San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 9 (1988), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987) and Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163
(1980)).
.. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590; Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck, 239
U.S. 394; Mugler, 123 U.S. 623; Jentgen, 657 F.2d 1210; Deltona, 657 F.2d 1184; Graham v. Estuary
Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981).
'" See Buck, supra note 3, at 1310.
.. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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fore lends its utility to the jurisprudence.' At minimum, the privi-
leges afforded owners substantially mute their pleas for assistance.
As can be assumed by the widespread adoption of this legal position,
notions of fairness and justice respond quite sympathetically to this
current majority view of the parcel as a whole.
3. Bisecting the Horizontal Plane
The nonsegmentation of the horizontal dimension has spawned
some limited controversy among jurists.'t Two alternative perspec-
tives have developed in the last two decades as a response to the
"original purchase" rule. In the first instance, the admonitions of
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia regarding the sanctity of the economic
viability of land generated considerable interest among landowners
and scholars. Their jurisprudence of conceptual severance' was
adopted at the beginning of this decade by two federal courts in
highly controversial opinions.'6 While the precedential value of
these cases has been extremely limited, they rekindled the determi-
nation and imagination of a new generation of property holders.
Secondly, some courts have discarded the "original purchase" rule in
split zoning cases, arguing that in these cases the government itself
forces separate denominators upon the owner.
Justice Rehnquist has unfailingly been willing to define the rele-
vant parcel as something less than the originally purchased tract."
In both Penn Central and Keystone, Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, pur-
sued the end of vertical segmentation.'6 In each case, he was willing
6 See supra at note 123.
' Fee, supra note 101 at 1561.
c William W. Fisher II, The Trouble with Lu=as, 45 STAN. L REv. 1393 (1993); Humbach, su-
pra note 3; Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L REv. 1600 (1988); Radin. supra note
70.
16 See infra at notes 179-191 and accompanying text.
.. See infia at 197-214.
' See Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 515 (Rehnquist. C.J.,
dissenting); Penn Central Tramp. Co. v. United States, 438 U.S. 104, 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, dis-
senting).
167 In Penn Centra4 Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the air space aboe Grand
Central Terminal was a property right in itself which was destroyed when the Terminal was des-
ignated as a landmark. Penn Cenmra, 438 U.S. at 141-43 & n.5 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (citing
U.S. v. Causly, 328 U.S. 256). Rehnquist went on to contend that tie ordinance did not fall
within the two exceptions which can prevent the destruction of property from becoming a tak-
ing. I at 144. He noted that the City was not abating a nuisance since the use wias not *dan-
gerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others." Id. at 145. Further, there was no average
reciprocity of advantage in this case since the plaintiff must bear a substantial loss while receiv-
ing no comparable benefit. I& at 147. Under this analysis, Justice Relmquist would have found
a taking. Id. at 144.
In Keystone, Rehnquist forwarded a similar view. There he determined the relevant parcel
was the support estate and this was required to remain undeieloped under the Subsidence Act.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 519 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Rehnquist reasoned that "'here the es-
1998]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
to accept the complete denial of use on one segment of the whole as
a unconstitutional takings.s Beginning with Keystone, he formulated
his position regarding the relevant parcel by analogizing to physical
invasion and appropriation cases. 69 Recognizing that a segment of a
larger parcel may be taken where the government physically invades
that segment, Rehnquist argued that the same should be true when
the regulation zeroed out all value from a portion of the whole.70
From the owner's perspective, the interest is destroyed completely,",
the impact on property rights is just as significant, 72 and all strands
of that particular segment are lost. 73 While Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged Penn Centra's conclusion that takings jurisprudence did
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments, he emphasized that
the Court gave no guidance on how one is to distinguish a "discrete
segment" from a "single parcel." 74 He was perfectly willing to allow
horizontal division of the original purchase, especially when the
segment represents an "identifiable and separable property inter-
est."175 As he counseled, where the property interest "is both sever-
able and of value in its own right, it is appropriate to consider the ef-
fect of regulation on that particular property interest.' 76 .
Adopting Rehnquist's position, and applying it to the horizontal
dimension, the Federal Circuit and the United States Court of
Claims delivered two highly publicized and controversial decisions
towards the end of the 1980s. 77 In both cases, these federal courts
rejected the majority view that the relevant parcel be defined by the
entire scope of the original purchase.'78 The decisions vigorously at-
tempted to distinguish earlier decisions by reinterpreting the bulk of
the Supreme Court's prior rulings. The judges highlighted the ex-
tate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is appropriate to con-
sider the effect of regulation on that particular property interest." Id. at 520.
' See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 516; Penn Centra 438 U.S. at 149-50 & n.13; see also Holdel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
'w See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 515-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
i'0 Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
'7 Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 517 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
'75 Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
'76 Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
17 The valuation of the relevant parcel was addressed in F/orida Rock Indus. v. United States,
791 F.2d 893, 904-05 (Ct. CI. 1986) and Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
'7' This view reflected the policy outlined in President Reagan's Executive Order 12,630 on
takings and the implementing Attorney General's Guidelines of June 30, 1988. This order re-
quired all federal regulations to be approved by agencies and the Attorney General. Id. at 443-
444. (Governmental Action and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,
Executive Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §601 (1988); see also
Wise, supra note 3.
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pectation interests of the landowners and underscored the economic
plight caused by the regulations. Consideration of the entire origi-
nal tract was dismissed; both decisions focused their takings analysis
solely on those portions of the whole for which the owners sought
the permits necessary for their intended uses.1.9
In FNorida Rock Industries v. United States, the Federal Circuit ruled
that the government's refusal to allow limestone mining on 98 out of
the owner's originally purchased 1,560 acre tract constituted a taking
of those 98 acres." The court inferred that the government was un-
likely to grant development approval for the remaining portion of
the 1,560 acre tract, and therefore concluded that it would be ludi-
crous to include such acreage in the takings calculation.'"' The
owner was thus allowed to carve out a particular piece of the whole
and have it separately examined for takings analysis by arguing that
the government's anticipated handling of the rest of the original
purchase would mirror its handling of the ninety-eight acre portion.
Even though the court admitted that the entire 1560 acre parcel had
not necessarily been stripped of all economically viable use,'" it al-
lowed the owner to anticipate potential litigation and self-identify
the relevant parcel.'8 Ignoring the significant body of precedent to
the contrary, the court merely accepted the lower court's definition
of the relevant parcel." By excluding the whole of the originally
purchased tract from its consideration, the court enabled owners to
claim compensation for a horizontal segment even though other
parts of the original purchase might retain considerable economic
value.
In Loveladies Harbor v. United States, the Claims Court refused to
delineate the "parcel as a whole" as all 250 acres comprising the
original purchase, but rather determined that the relevant parcel in-
cluded only the 12.5 acres of wetlands subject to permit require-
ments. 185 The court first distinguished its prior decision in Deltona,"5
" SeeRorida Roc, 791 F.2d at 904-905; Lordadis, 15 CL CL. at 393.
' See Rorida Rock, 791 F.2d 893.
. Id. at 904 ("Here the Army engineers considered only 98 acres. As to the rest, it is and for
the immediate future, remains illegal to mine without a permit in the only fashion Florida Rock
considers feasible.").
2 See id. at 904-905 (stating that it hoped the takings award may cause the government to
reconsider whether the continued protection of the balance of the acreage was worth the price
to the public fisc).
3 SeeFee, supra note 101, at 1549.
IS SweeRorida Rock, 791 F.2d at 905-906.
1 Lovdadies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392. First, the court narrowed the relevant parcel to the 57.4 acres
still owned by the plaintiffs, then further limited the relevant parcel by determining that 38.5 of
these acres could not be developed because the state had already denied the necessary permits
for them. Of the 18.9 acres that remained, 6.4 acres were either not affected by the permit de-
nial, not claimed to have been taken, or were not contiguous to the 12.5 acre parcel. Id. at 393.
Arguing that the Supreme Court in Penn Cntral had held that 'noncontiguous properties not
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explaining that case had failed "to require a rigid rule that the parcel
as a whole must include all land originally owned by plaintiffs."'87
Even though the owner's original 250 acre purchase included eco-
nomically viable land, the court, citing Keystone and Florida Rock,ss
limited its review to the value of that property which the owners held
when the taking was said to have occurred (57.4 acres). The court
then excluded the owner's wetland holdings not mentioned in the
claim, 189 an additional 38.5 acres of the plaintiffs' holdings. Finally,
contending that Penn Central forced the conclusion that non-
contiguous properties not directly at issue cannot be said to fall
within the parcel as a whole, the court excluded 6.4 acres of nonwet-
land holdings which were not adjacent to the regulated portion.'"
Accordingly, the court ruled that the relevant parcel for takings
analysis was the 12.5 acre portion subject to federal wetlands regula-
tion.191
While Florida Rock and Loveladies received the enthusiastic ap-
plause of landowners, the immediate support of their attorneys, and
the close scrutiny of academics,19 the cases had little real impact on
altering the judicial preference for defining takings' relevant parcel
as the entirety of the original tract. Many of the legal positions ar-
directly at issue cannot be said to fall within the parcel as a whole" (citation omitted), the
Claims Court limited the relevant parcel to the 12.5 acres subject to the permit. Id.
"6 See id. at 392.
187 Id.
... See id. The court noted that:
[T]he Supreme Court did not include all the property which was held at the time of the
original purchase, i.e., all of the coal which was in the ground when the property was
originally purchased in the early 1900's. Rather, the Supreme Court defined the value of
the parcel as a whole as 'the value that remained in the property' when the taking was
said to have occurred.
Id.
"7 See id at 392-393. The court held that an additional 38.5 acres out of the 57.4 acres could
not be developed as the state had denied the necessary permits for the same.
"0 Id. at 393 ("Such physically nonadjacent or non-contiguous property cannot be considered
as part of the single parcel as a whole just because it was formerly owned by plaintiff at one
time.").
... The Claims Court ultimately ruled that the owner had suffered a regulatory takings since
the permit denial had "virtually.. .eradicated" the value of the 12.5 acre portion. Loveladies, 21
Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990). By limiting the takings denominator to the small piece of the whole,
the owner could trace that the value of the acreage decreased by more than 99 percent, the
difference in value between use as residential lots and use for recreation and conservation pur-
poses.
.. See generally Schleich, supra note 3; Humbach, supra note 3; Kerry T. Scarlott, Note, Federal
Regulation of Wetlands and the Public Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: The Casefor Insulating
Wetlands Regulations Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 917 (1993); Haff-
ner, supra note 3;Julia Kreidler Hickey, Rorida Rock Industries v. United States: A Categorical Regula-
tory Taking, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245 (1995); Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?
Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVrL. L.
171 (1995).
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ticulated in the two cases lacked any real analytical development.
The courts used conclusory statements to arrive at many of their po-
sitions without providing legal or jurisprudential support for their
theories. They also manipulated case precedent to fit their opinions,
by misapglying dicta of Penn Centrat9s and misreading the holding of
Keystone. While landowners had definitely found allies in these two
courts, the precedential value of their holdings was minimized. The
long judicial history and the solid jurisprudential underpinnings of
the "original purchase" rule easily withstood the challenges provided
by these two rulings.
Even though most courts continued to use "original purchase" as
the appropriate horizontal measure of the relevant parcel, Florida
Rock and Loveladies kindled a new excitement among landowners
concerning the possibility of narrowing the takings denominator.
"
Landowners attacked takings' expansive measuring stick with re-
newed energies. They argued for numerous exceptions to the tradi-
tional rule," waiting patiently for the Supreme Court to expressly
limit the relevant parcel's dimensions. This excitement reached new
levels first with the Court's addition of several new justices'" and
then with its decision to review the ruling of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comnission.9'
Lucas made the difficult task of defining the relevant parcel for
takings calculations even more crucial. The Supreme Court agreed
that David Lucas had suffered a taking of his beachfront lots because
the government's coastal regulations had denied him "all economi-
" See Lovdadies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393. The court misapplied Penn entralwhen it concluded that
Penn Central is authority for the position that noncontiguous properties not directly at issue can-
not be said to fall within the parcel as a whole. Presumably this mistake %as derived from the
fact that Penn Central only dealt with the company's city tax block rather than all of its holdings
in the city.
1.4 See id. at 392. The court misread Kqystone when it interpreted the case as holding that the
parcel as a whole was only the value that remained in the property when the taking occurred.
6 See supra note 78. After Penn Central there uas an influx of cases before the state and fed-
eral courts. The "cy spell" that occurred following Pentylvania Coal had vanished.
'96 Landowners began arguing for ad hoc, noncontiguous evaluations that would look at the
parcel at the time of regulation. See Wise, supra note 3; Robert IdL Washburn. Land Use Control,
the Individual and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L REV. 162 (1993);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 28; Schleich, supra note 3; Fee, supra note 101; George W. Miller &
Jonathan L Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal Clairs and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L REv. 863 (1993).
'9 The Court has been shifting towards a greater property-rights orientation. The Rehnquist-
Scalia idea of the relevant parcel is becoming the majority view and is likely to gain support from
recent changes on the Supreme Court. Since 1990, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer have been ap-
pointed and Justice Blackmun has retired. Justice Ginsberg has been a consistent vote for the
moderate wing of the Court on economic and social issues. More recently. Justice Breyer has
expressed a strong commitment to the personal freedoms in the Bill of Rights.
' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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cally beneficial or productive use"'9 of his land. Typical police power
concerns would no longer provide sufficient justification for the re-
striction if the owner's economic interest were so drastically ef-
fected.2°  The Court thereby penned a new per se test: when a land-
owner is denied an economically viable use for the property, just
compensation must be guaranteed."'
This new legal standard brought renewed emphasis to the deter-
mination of the relevant parcel. As Justice Scalia noted, the horizon-
tal dimensions of the relevant parcel can dictate the takings calcu-
lus.20 2 However, the Court once again could not agree upon how to
determine the scope of the relevant parcel.0 3 Justice Scalia under-
' Id. at 1015. In 1986, David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots, planning to develop each
as a single-family residence. Two years after his purchase, the South Carolina Legislature en-
acted the Beachfront Management Act. This Act prohibited construction of any permanent
residential structure within a certain distance of the high water mark. Lucas' lots were within
the beachfront setback and therefore his development plans were destroyed. He claimed that
the total value of his property had been taken, roughly $1,200,000. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
m Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Justice Scalia stated that:
We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as com-
pensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a
physical 'invasion' of his property. In general... no matter how minute the intrusion,
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensa-
tion.... The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate
is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.
Id at 1015. Scalia additionally limited the nuisance exception in finding that land use restric-
tions do not always effect a taking if they substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Id. at
1022-23 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)).
291 See id. at 1015.
See id at 1016 n.7.
20 Id. at 1003. In Lucas, the Court evaluated several options for determining the relevant
parcel. The majority suggested that the definition of property is "in the ... background princi-
ples of the State's law of property and nuisance." Id. at 1029. The Court attempted to expand
on this definition by explaining that the definition of the parcel could be found in the owner's
reasonable expectations that were shaped by the State's law of property - more specifically
whether and to what degree the State's law had accorded legal recognition and protection to
the particular interest in land which had been diminished. Id. at 1016 n.7. Justice Kennedy in
his concurring opinion suggested a broader definition of the relevant parcel. He asserted that
the background principles of nuisance law were too restrictive in today's modem society. lie
advocated that the definition of property be defined by the owner's reasonable expectation's no
matter what their source. See id. at 1034-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ultimately, the Court
avoids answering how to address the issue of defining property. See id. at 1017. Justice Black-
mun, in his dissenting opinion, stated that he felt the petitioner could still "enjoy other attrib-
utes of ownership, such as the right to exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Id. at 1044 (citing Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 176 (1979)). He continued, stating that the petitioner also "re-
tain[ed] the right to alienate the land, which would have value for neighbors and for those pre-
pared to enjoy proximity to the ocean without a house." Id. at 1044-45.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, the Court determined that the "support
estate" was "merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner." 480 U.S. at
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scored this fact when he stated that "[r]egrettably, the rhetorical
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is
greater than its precision," because the rule does not "make clear the
'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be meas-
ured."2M This, however, did not prevent Scalia from attempting some
definition. Borrowing heavily from Justice Rehnquist's earlier posi-
tions, Scalia, writing for the majority, suggested that the answer to
defining the relevant parcel could lie in how "the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property." ' The
parcel unit would be delineated by the degree to which state law had
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest
in land suffering the diminution in value.2" While Scalia's rhetoric
applies most dearly to the vertical dimension, with its possible seg-
mentation into support, surface and air estates, he expressly em-
ployed the same in an example involving possible horizontal seg-
21mentation. 0 Scalia's dicta leave the clear impression that he would
favor requiring compensation in many cases where regulation denies
all use of a portion of a larger parcel. Notably, Lucas provides little
analytical basis in support of, or for the application of, this position.
State common laws generally do not recognize differing "horizontal"
estates or address how to treat the subdivision of large tracts for tak-
ings analysis. In addition, except for the limitations of minimum lot
size, an owner is usually permitted to sever horizontally any parcel
into multiple smaller fees. If each of these new fees could serve as
the regulatory takings denominator for their own use limitation,
then owners would be able to self-select the limits of police power
501. Thus, the Court concluded that the support estate's destruction merely eliminated one
segment of the total property. The dissent, however, "characterized the support estate as a dis-
tinct property interest that was wholly destroyed." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054. (citing Keystone, 480
U.S. at 519).
In Lucas, Justice Blackmun noted further that, "state courts historically hale been less
likely to find that a government action constitutes a taking when the affected land is undevel-
oped." Id. at 1059 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added, "Iblecause of the elastic
nature of property rights, the Court's new rule vuill also prove unsound in practice. In response
to the rule, courts may define 'property' broadly and only rarely find regulations to effect total
takings." Id. at 1065 (StevensJ., dissenting); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Definng Prep
en" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63 Fordham L Rev. 1853, 1865-68 (1995); Frank. supra note
27; Haffner, supra note 3.
2" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
I& at 1017 n.7.
"6 See i&
'7 See a Justice Scalia argues that
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its
natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in x'hich the
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of
the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the
tract as a whole.
Id. at 1016 n.7.
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legislation by tailoring self-serving narrow denominators."' Divisions
could be factored to isolate the impacts of present and anticipated
future regulation and effect total wipeouts of property value requir-
ing compensation under Lucas. The implications of this scenario
likely reach beyond what even Scalia would find acceptable, threaten-
ing the very fabric of government's regulatory network. As has been
suggested, Scalia most likely borrowed this notion of employing a
common law analysis from Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone without
fully judging how it would apply to the horizontal plane."
4. Split Zoning Cases
Barring the theoretical preferences of Rehnquist and Scalia and
excluding the few lower court cases which adopted their jurispruden-
tial leanings,10 the split zoning cases provide the only notable excep-
tion to the original purchase rule. These cases characteristically in-
volve a single owner with multiple acreage and an ordinance that
creates several distinct zoning areas within that acreage. The regula-
tion thus isolates particular portions of an owner's holdings and pos-
its that there are good reasons for treating the areas differently.
When faced with a takings challenge involving only one of the desig-
nated zoning areas, courts must consider whether to measure the ef-
fect of the restriction on that limited portion or on the whole of the
owner's contiguous property.
American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Mann' is illustrative.
American Savings acquired sixty-eight acres of land in Main County
in 1973 by bankruptcy sale. In 1974, the county adopted a plan that
rezoned forty-eight of the acres as "urban open space" and the re-
maining twenty acres as multiple residential use.12 American Savings
sued, alleging that the zoning ordinance resulted in an unconstitu-
tional taking of its land, destroying its development plans for the
forty-eight acre portion. Acknowledging that American Savings' con-
tiguous land was zoned to allow a substantially high density, the trial
court ruled that for "taking" purposes all of the plaintiff's contiguous
See Fee, supra note 100, at 1550. Allowing property owners to define the relevant parcel
without any limitation would lead to a definition of the "relevant interest as precisely those
rights that were abrogated - a complete negative easement in every case." Id.
2' See id. at 1556-57 n.88. In Keystone, Rehnquist suggested that a parcel could be divided if
the State had defined the regulated portion as a separate estate. As Rehnquist noted in his dis-
sent, "where the estate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is
appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that particular property interest." Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 520 (1987).
'0 Both Justice Scalia and Rehnquist have shown that they generally side with the property-
rightists on this issue of takings jurisprudence; however, it is likely that both Justices would ob-
ject to being called property-rightists.
' 653 F.2d 364 (1981).
2' See id. at 367.
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land was to be considered as a single parcel. The trial court empha-
sized that the portions were legally a single parcel because they were
contiguous, owned by the same party, and intended for the same
use. Since the combination of the two zoning designations merely
lowered the overall value of the parcel rather than destroying it
completely, the court held there was no taking. 3
On appeal, American Savings maintained that the validity of the
ordinance should be judged separately by the effect of the particular
zoning designation on the 48 acre segment. Because the two pieces
were zoned differently, it argued the effect of the ordinance must be
judged differently.14 If one portion's unique zoning deprived it of
any beneficial use, then an unconstitutional taking occurred. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, reason-
ing that any deprivation by a non-uniform ordinance of a portion of
contiguous property which is otherwise economically viable requires
that the zoning be evaluated separately for takings purposes.
21
5'
Other cases have lead to similar results. A California Court of
Appeal ruled in Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cru '6 that con-
tiguous acreage under a single owner could be segmented for tak-
ings analysis if the acreage were subject to different zoning restric-
tions. Whether the challenged ordinance created two separate
parcels for takings purposes by adopting different zoning designa-
tions for each portion was a question of fact. The court emphasized
that when government action divides contiguous property under
single ownership into separate zones the restriction of development
in one of those zones may lead to a takings. -1 7 Several years later, an-
other California Court of Appeal refused to treat a 1.7 acre portion
of an original 8.5 acre tract as "part of the whole."2 18 The court em-
phasized that takings precedent "does not demand the entire 8.5
acre parcel be treated as a whole,"2 19 where the 1.7 acre portion w-as
previously an economically viable unit independent of the larger
21s See i& at 368. The court elaborated: "[W]here a single party has a single contiguous par-
cel of property affected by a community zoning program, and where that program permits a
reasonable profitable use of the property taken as a whole, that no claim has been made for a
[sic] unlawful taking...." RL
214 See i& at 368.
215 See id at 369-71. The court distinguished single parcel analysis for the a%ard of severance
damages in condemnation cases, noting that in these cases, the relevant parcel is determined by
the law of eminent domain while in inverse condemnation cases the parcel is determined by
takingsjurisprudence. It also distinguished Gorfib on the basis that the strip affected by setback
requirements was not economically viable when separated from the whole lot. I& at 371 n.6.
216 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (App. Ct. 1982), appeal dismissd 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
217 See i& at 198. This court, like American Savings, took time to distinguish Penn Central not-
ing its focus on the vertical dimension, and its factual differences; namely, it did not invol
contiguous property for which different zoning designations were adopted. Id.
2 Twain Harte Associates, Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737 (App. Ct. 1990).
.Iat 745.
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parcel. Similarly, in Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County,220 the
Supreme Court of Oregon cautioned that a parcel might be divided
for takings analysis into two separate units when the government had
adopted separate zoning classifications for each. Although the
owner had purchased a twenty acre parcel for development as a
shopping center, the county's comprehensive plan divided the lot
into several separate zones. In dicta, the court divided the property
analytically into those areas classified as commercial or residential
and those classified as greenway or transit station. As to the second,
the court advised that a cause of action for inverse condemnation
could be stated and that diminution analysis would be individually
applied.2 '
Significantly, all of the courts in these cases take care in distin-
guishing their factual setting. Noting that their position may at first
seem inconsistent with general principles governing takings juris-
prudence, the courts carefully distance themselves from prior prece-
dent to highlight the distinct nature of their inquiry. For example,
they may argue that while Multnomah County v. Howell asserted that
"the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance must be tested by its ef-
fect on the whole of the... contiguous property, not simply... on a
portion thereof,"2' and while Penn Central stated that "taking juris-
,,225prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments,
both cases involved instances where the entire subject property was
covered by a uniform restriction. In Multnomah County, all of the
owner's thirteen acres were zoned agricultural-residential; in Penn
Central, the challenged government action did not divide the prop-
erty into discrete segments.
As the split-zoning decisions stress, the central distinguishing
question is whether the governmental regulation itself creates two
separate parcels for taking purposes by adopting different zoning
designations for each2 4 In effect, the courts suggest that when the
government acts to create separate use zones pursuant to its notion
of the public good, it implicitly creates two new areas for takings
analysis. The government may not maximize its benefit in both di-
rections (two parcels for usage purposes, but one parcel for diminu-
tion calculus) by placing all the costs on the private owner. In short,
the message which the courts seem to deliver is that the government
must reap what it sows.
m 581 P.2d 50 (Or. Ct. Ap. 1978).
2' See id. at 61.
496 P.2d 235, 238 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
24 It is interesting to note that while some of these cases attempt to cite Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), as precedent, they do so incorrectly. Nectow was resolved under
arbitrary and capricious standards; the single/double parcel issue was not considered.
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While this analysis embodies a certain intuitive charm, it is
grounded neither in sound logic nor in cohesive jurisprudence. The
courts' naivetd manifests itself at several points. Most notably, it sur-
faces in the assumption that differential zoning decisions require
that the areas be evaluated separately for other purposes. It is not
uncommon for a single parcel to receive zones for separate use and
yet have those separate use zones receive common treatment in a
whole host of other areas, such as taxation and minimum lot re-
quirements.n Differential zoning within a single parcel is the result
of certain policy based decisions made by governmental entities.a*5
These policies have little, if anything, to do with the diminution
analysis of regulatory takings.227 It is eminently logical to have sanita-
tion and congestion concerns dictate separate use zones on a single
parcel, yet at the same time measure the effects of a wetlands desig-
nation on the value of the parcel as a whole.
Regardless of whether benefits or burdens are shifted between
the two areas as a result of the zoning classification, the overall regu-
latory calculus remains constant. Diminution in value is rightly
measured against the original tract, rather than focusing the math
on the later restricted area. Although the court in American Say. &
Loan asserted that "it seems obvious the question of whether two re-
lated parcels will be treated as one in the development process is not
an issue separate and apart from the question about whether there
has been a 'taking'," 22' it should be clear that separate use designa-
tion does not split a parcel in two for takings purposes. Fortunately,
decisions like American Savings & Loan are rare. Indeed, commen-
tary on these decisions are much more prevalent than the court
adoption of the same.2 While an ad hoc analysis of the particular
circumstances can be decisive, courts continue to maintain their fo-
cus on the parcel's original entirety.
222 See genera/ly, Broadwvater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232,240 (CL Cl.
1996) (stating that because property is taxed as individual lots does not preclude a finding that
there is a contiguous parcel).
2" See Twain Harte Assoc. Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737, 745 (CL App
1990) (explaining that the parcel was split into commercial zone and open space in order to
preserve the land); American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Matin County, 653 F2d 364, 367 (9th Cir.
1981) (explaining that the split zoning was due to particular environmental problems and con-
cerns); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct App. 1952), ap-
peal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805 (1983) (applying separate development standards to a single parcel
in order to preserve 70 acres of beachlands); F.fth Ave. Corp., 581 P.2d 50 (Or. CL App. 1978)
(revising of comprehensive plan was to preserve the intent and purpose of the original plan).
That is assuming that the governmental action is not arbitrary or capricious.
22 See Twain Hart4 265 Cal. Rptr. at 745, quotingAmerican Say. & Loan, 653 F.2d at 364.
See, eg. Terry Rice, Mdzat Proper, Interests Aferit Taking Pro, dion?, Land Use Law (February
1991) (advocating that when there are two classifications on one parcel, one of the ad hoc fac-
tors considered should be a density transfer scheme because this allows greater densities on the
less restricted parcel).
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5. The Ad Hoc Factor Inquiry
Given the conflicting and often irreconcilable approaches which
courts take to determine the appropriate definition of the unit of
parcel, many courts have recently attempted to resolve the issue by
engaging in an ad hoc factual inquiry." These courts amass what
they consider to be the relevant factors in the case before them and
then proceed to utilize these factors to calculate the parcel size ap-
propriate for takings purposes in the case at hand. This approach
found its first prominent voice in Kaiser Development Co. v. City of
Honolulu."' Ostensibly, the court weighed the factor that the 6000
acre parcel was originally held as a single tract against other factors:
the 200 acre area had been separated from the whole by a road; that
it had not yet been developed, it had been zoned differently, and
that it had been designated for a different land use by the generalplan.
Perhaps the most well-known advocate for an ad hoc approach
has been the United States Claims Court. In its often cited opinion
of Ciampitti v. United States,s the court counseled that any takings
analysis should "identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possi-
ble, given the entire factual and regulatory environment."
2
1
Whether the parcel should be segregated and viewed separately or
considered as a whole depends upon such considerations as the de-
gree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the
parcel had been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the
protected area enhance the value of the remaining lands.2' Such a
multi-factor analysis should disclose the equities inherent in the land
scheme and direct a reasoned determination of the relevant parcel.
Under this approach, a proper takings analysis would set forth de-
tailed factual findings which would guide the court toward calculat-
ing the proper geographic dimensions of the taking area."'
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Kaiser Dev. Co. v.
City of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926, 947 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153 (1990); Ciampitti v. United States
22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
" 649 F. Supp. 926, 947 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 200 acre area of a 6000 acre parcel
should be considered a separate tract for takings analysis) The court stressed that "[t]he de-
termination whether to treat land as a single parcel for determining its value depends on nu-
merous factors, such as unity of use, contiguity, physical characteristics, historical considera-
tions, and how the land has been treated both by the landowner and by the government". Id.
23 Id. at 947-48.
" 22 C. Ct. 310 (1991).
2m Id. at 319.
23 Id. at 318.
" For a detailed listing of the factors one court took into consideration see Reahard v. Lee
County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (1992). The court stated that a proper takings analysis would con-
sider the following factors:
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The inherent appeal of the ad hoc inquiry is that the court ap-
pears to expressly apply justice to a specific factual setting. Individu-
als sometimes seem to presume that the more detailed and splin-
tered the court's investigation of factors the more inherently fair is
its subsequent holding. In part, such detailed investigations reflect a
basic legal tendency to make certain that no stone is unturned, that
no surprises lurk in the waiting, and that no factor has been over-
looked by the court. Exhaustive research replaces jurisprudence and
the accumulation of data replaces legal analysis. As the court inds
its way through the detailed checklist of factors, the correctness of its
position appears enhanced.1 7 The answer to its takings inquiry is not
merely the result of a single-dimensional investigation, but rather a
multi-layered smorgasbord that, if properly analyzed, will uncover
the proper unit of parcel.
Unfortunately, this strategy does not provide the courts ith a
panacea for the takings problem. There is no yellow brick road lead-
ing the conscientious jurist to the "correct" denominator. In reality,
the multi-factor case-by-case approach increases uncertainty by allow-
ing courts to manipulate the factors toward their own predetermined
conclusion. This approach effectively permits a court to shield itself
from the policy ramifications of its decision by switching the ob-
server's focus to separate identifiable facts. Without the gestalt of an
overriding policy orientation, takings inquiries quickly dissolve into
random accumulations of component-based biases. That jurists or
(1) the history of the property - when was it purchased? How much land uas purchased?
Where was the land located? What was the nature of title? What ua the composition of
the land and how was it initially used?; (2) the history of the development - what uw built
on the property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to whom was it sold? What
plats were filed? What roads were dedicated?; (3) the history of zoning and the regula-
tion - how and when was the land classified? How uas use proscribed? What changes in
classifications occurred?; (4) how did the development change when title passed?; (5)
what is the present nature and extent of the property?; (6) what were the reasonable ex-
pectations of the landowner under state common law?; (7) what were the reasonable ex-
pectations of the neighboring landowners under state common law; and (8) perhaps
most importantly, what was the diminution in the investment-backed expectations of the
landowner, if any, after passage of the regulation.
Id. at 1136.
SeeJohn U. Groen, 7he Relevant Pared Iute, C872 ALI-ABA 167. 182 (1993). Groen lists
several factors that the court Nill use to determine the relevant parcel. When the court chooses
an ad hoc approach it includes the following factors throughout its analysis: (1) contiguity of
properties; (2) unity of use; (3) physical characteristic or natural boundaries; (4) historical con-
siderations; (5) how the land has been treated by the landowner, as a single parcel or as sepa-
rate parcels; (6) how the land has been treated by the government; (7) dates of acquisition; (8)
terms of purchase and financing; (9) degree of legal recognition and protection of the particu-
lar property interests under state law; (10) degree to which the particular property is an identi-
fiable and severable property interest; (11) whether the particular interest is a fundamental at-
tribute of ownership; (12) whether the portion has value and is economically valuable apart
from the larger parcel; (13) and any other fact with may have bearing on the issue.
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observers may convince themselves of the objectivity of their investi-
gations is not surprising; self-deception pervades the human species
and is an integral part of the law.
Yet, attention to detail does not provide an enhanced manage-
ment of the equities. Reliance on multiple factors can be manipu-
lated in opposite directions, depending upon the will of the court -
either toward viewing the parcel expansively or toward viewing it
narrowly. As previously mentioned, the District Court of Hawaii
ruled that two adjacent parcels should be considered separately for
takings purposes after applying an ad hoc factual inquiry.3 How-
ever, applying a very similar list of factors to a very similar factual set-
ting, the Court of Federal Claims held that two contiguous lots
240should be treated as a single parcel for takings purposes.
Such wizardry is the net result of this ad hoc approach. Courts
are empowered to reach any result. The factors provide the neces-
sary tools to construct any desired outcome. Takings decisions de-
mand more. They affect and define the very fabric of our society and
command the most reasoned jurisprudential foundation. This is an
area where the individual predilections of the trier of fact should be
constrained for overriding societal concerns. Sound policy is not the
product of either judicial whim or political expediency.
IV. A BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL VIEW OF TAKINGSJURISPRUDENCE
Current takings analysis begins from a peculiar vantage point.
Reflecting the particular world-view of the frontier and the Judeo-
Christian male, takings analysis starts from a particularly American
view of property: one's land is one's castle. According to this view,
the individual is master over his/her defined space. The American
image of the rugged, self-sufficient individual fosters notions of envi-
ronmental dominion and control. What happens on, under, or
above one's parcel is a matter of individual concern; only rarely,
should an "outsider's" interest be allowed to invade this sacred area.
See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 263-86 (1994).
See Kaiser Development Co. v. Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 947 (Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 90-1108) (holding that the two parcels were separate be-
cause the property was naturally divided by a road, the owners had separate development plans
and the city had treated the two parcels separate for zoning and planning purposes); see also
American Savings & Loan Assn v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 369 (1981) (concluding that
the two contiguous parcels were separate since the owner and county had treated them as sepa-
rate for zoning and development purposes).
240 See Ciampitt, 22 Cl. Ct. 310. Ciampitti had purchased 45 acres with the intent to separately
develop each of the lots. The court found that there was not a taking because he had purchased
the land under a single financing plan. Id. at 320. Additionally, the court noted that Ciampitti
was aware of the risk that the land was subject to government wetlands protection well before he
purchase it and he failed to take the necessary precautions to insure that he would be able to
develop the land. Id. at 321.
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The vagaries of the marketplace have likewise reinforced this
uniquely American orientation. In our capitalistic society, land is a
fundamental economic good. Land is wealth. Since individual
status and position are largely a reflection of economic power, much
of individual self-meaning and notions of self-worth are directly cor-
related to the size of the individual's asset base. Real property often
accounts for a substantial portion of personal wealth. Thus, attacks
on this base are attacks on the individual. Economic stability simi-
larly reinforces a sense of personal stability as well as a feeling of well-
being and security. Any devaluation as a result of another's needs or
concerns is viewed as having direct fiscal consequences on the eco-
nomic viability of the owner. The loss of particular uses is equivalent
to the loss of value. Regulation can therefore directly interfere with
an individual's perceived economic security and corresponding no-
tions of well-being. Economic consequences produce psychological
reactions. In America, decreasing land values often coincide with a
sense of personal devaluation and loss of self-esteem.
Against this backdrop, takings law has developed. It is not sur-
prising then that this singular vision of the inviolability of real prop-
erty rights has been translated into a legal culture that emphasizes
individual ownership interests and private individual expectations.
Notions of justice and fairness similarly follow this cultural orienta-
tion, creating expectations of compensation when the government
interferes with these perceived rights. These presumptions substan-
tially narrow the debate over takings jurisprudence. If one begins by
heralding the sanctity and inviolability of ownership rights, it be-
comes logical to perceive governmental restrictions on these sacred
rights as wrong and punitive.
A. The Biology of Property
The American notion of property is molded by and deeply rooted
in our species' biological predispositions. These predispositions
help explain the close psychological connection we have with our
real property and the prejudice we display in takings cases. Humans
are predisposed to certain behaviors. "4 ' Millions of years of evolu-
tionary change have shaped our species' natural behavioral tenden-
"' See gmneraly, JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLutlO.A w APPRO.CH (5th cd.
1993); DAVID BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR (1977); and ,-ARaRET GRLTER. LkW AND
THE MIND (1991). While human behavior is full of fascinating mysteries, there is little scientific
doubt that the human species is predisposed to act in a variety of 'programmed' wa). Human
sexual behavior, mate choice, and parental care are dear examples. No longer is the question
whether human behavior is genetically determined, but rather to what extent. The evolution of
the human capacity to make rules and law is itself now thought to be part of our biology.
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242cies in very definite ways. The Darwinian forces of reproductive
success have molded a species adaptive to, and exploitive of, its envi-
ronment. 24  We do not come into this world With a tabula rasa; our
evolutionary history is deeply implanted into every fabric of our biol-ogy244 It is no coincidence then that incest taboos and nepotistic
behavior permeate human history.24 Biologists are not surprised to
find universal tendencies toward short-term goal acquisition and
avoidance of indiscriminate altruism. 46
Our evolutionary origins have likewise molded our notion of
property. Like our primate relatives, humans are strikingly territo-
rial. An elementary course in historical geography clearly illustrates
this feature. Without the ability of flight or the burrowing capacities
of other animals, human territorial impulses mainly occupy the hori-
zontal plane.247 Humans orient themselves spatially in the world, oc-
See generally EDWARD WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (1978); ROBERT AXELROD, TIlE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); LIONEL TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1984); and
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (Napoleon Chagnon & William Irons,
eds., Duxbury Press 1979). Reproduction results in the mixing of genes. Human behavior is
the consequence of genetic information that is associated with greater reproductive success.
Because of our genetic variance, our behavior varies. Evolution has favored the selection of
genes and these tend to influence human behavior. Over millions of years of evolution, basic
self-interested behaviors have survived selection. As Gruter has noted, "[t]he net effect of these
evolutionary events is that as individuals we continue to be strongly predisposed to behave in
self-interested ways, so as to assure our own and our kin's survival, to control resources, to en-
gage in and win competitive interests, and soon." LAW AND THE MIND, at 53 (1991).
211 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); RICHARD DAWINS, THE BLIND
WATCHMAKER (1986); DOUGLAS FUTUIYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION (1983);
and MARVIN HARRIS, CANNIBALS AND KINGS (1991). Each individual is molded by an interaction
between that individual's environment and the genes that affect social behavior. The traits of
human nature were adapted as the human species evolved. Only those traits which increase
human reproductive success proliferated.
'" The historical influence of evolution appears throughout human behavior. Species-wide
behaviors such as the desire to attain status, sexual jealousy, parental investment, and male ag-
gression underlie the fact that we enter the world with specific and strong predilections. While
cultures may vary these patterns, humans maintain an extraordinary symmetry of behavioral
predispositions. See generally MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988); RICHARD
ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS (1987); DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF
DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING (1994); and THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF AGGRESSION (Marc
Hillbarand & Nathaniel Pallone, eds., Duxbury Press 1994). Indeed, the human brain has
evolved, retaining anatomical and chemical features reflecting an ancestral relationship to rep-
tiles, early mammals and late mammals. It is the most recently evolved sections of the brain that
have likely made law and the notion of justice possible. See PAUL MACLEAN, A TRIANGULAR
BRIEF AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN AND LAW (Primus 1992).
' See generally GRUTER, supra note 242; and DALY & WILSON, supra note 244.
' Evolution has resulted in a species that is strongly predisposed to act in certain defined
ways and that is also constrained from acting in other ways. Humans are strongly motivated to
forward their individual self-interest while limiting many forms of non-kin reciprocal behavior.
See GRUTER, supra note 242 at 122-31; ALcOCK, supra note 241.
247 Christopher Boehm traces human horizontal bias in part to the movement of our ances-
tors from being arboreal primates to terrestrial primates. Boehm also argued that terrestrial
adaptation created selection pressures favoring a more socially sensitive species. THE
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cupying and defending surface territories. Until very recently,
threats and attacks originated along the horizontal plane and hu-
mans naturally measured their "place" by depth and width calcula-
tions. The space which had real effect was the horizontally- oriented
ground upon which crops grew, game was hunted, and others tres-
passed. The ground that supported human feet reflected the physi-
cal dimension of importance. Any territorial imperative generally
minimized vertical significance, emphasizing the outvard-
directedness of terra firma. Indeed, such internal templates guide
and control a wealth of human experiences. °'
Humans are also predisposed to link possessory claims to spatial
proximity-the closer an object is physically to a person, the more
likely that person is to claim ownership of the object as well as to be
perceived as the owner of the object. Margaret Gruter has postu-
lated that the visual stimuli of seeing an individual and an object to-
gether might create a gestalt that triggers brain chemicals. ' These
chemicals lead to characteristic behaviors such as submission to
"ownerslup" rights and moralistic aggression when "possession" is
violated. " Respect for possession results when we perceive physical
closeness between two individuals or between an individual and an
object25 Physical proximity creates a gestalt which causes feelings of
"rightness" or "balance" in the viewer. 12 Interference with this ge-
stalt engenders feelings of violation and rage.25 This sense of "me"
and my immediate environment forming a unity is reinforced by
feelings of well-being. Indeed, Gruter has suggested that the visual
EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY AS AN EFFECT OF DOMiNANcE BEAWIOR ,AND
CONFLICrhITERFERENCE (Primus 1992).
2" A baby will stick out its tongue when another human extends her tongue. This is not
learned behavior but merely one instance of our biological preuiring. For a general but fasci-
nating discussion of our internal templates, se NIGEL CALDER, THE HumN CONSPIRACY (1976).
2' See Gruter, supra note 241, at 43.
'9 See id. See also FRANS DENVAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES (1989).
2" See GRUTER, supra note 242, at 3. Gruter recalls a report by Jane Goodall about the one
time in twenty years that she was seriously attacked by a chimpanzee--this %%s when she at-
tempted to take a banana dropped by a female, even though the female held dozens of others.
,See MARGARET GRUTER, BIOLOGICALLY BASED BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH AND THE FACTS OF
LAiw (Primus 1992). Gruter posits that respect for the possessor and his/her possession may
have developed as a behavioral trait over a period of hundreds of thousands of years. She allo-r
that the concept of possession may have in part developed from the other-child relation, where
the nursing mother is perceived as having the "right" to actually hold and possess her infant.
M See Robert Frank, Emotion and the Costs of Altruism- The Eonomic Foundations of the Sense of
JUstiC4 in THE SENSE OFJUSTICE, 47-66 (Masters and Gruter, eds., 1992). Our emotions can be
viewed as "commitment devices" which allow an individual to signal responses that entail long-
term benefits despite short-term costs. Therefore, even when it is not rational to retaliate in
certain circumstances, we are advantaged by others thinking we will retaliate (i.e.. that we are
emotional, rather than purely rational). Emotional behavior is evolutionarily advantageous. See
Robert Frank, Emotion and the Costs of Altuism. The Economic Foundations of the Sense ofjustfie, in
THE SENSE OFJUSTICE, 47-66 (Masters and Gruter, eds., 1992).
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stimuli of perceiving oneself as linked with the horizontal plane may
trigger endorphin production,2 reinforcing a particularly personal
relation to land.
This biology of possession, based upon physical proximity, seems
so strong that education has little effect on modifying the behavior.
When children in Israeli kibbutzim were taught that toys are to be
shared, they readily understood that others' toys were available for
their amusement, but steadfastly refused to allow other children to
play with their own toys.25 Although children could accept the prin-
ciple that things should belong to everyone and would even demand
that their friends' toys be freely shared, they themselves proved very
reticent to part with their own things.256 As Eibl-Eibesfeldt summa-
rized, the children "tended to be grabby."257 There seems to be a dif-
ferent psychological orientation when we view our relations to our
own possessions than when we view another's relations to her posses-
sions. The norm of personal possession seems biologically based; we
simply cannot educate "possession" or "possessiveness" out of our
species. The physical plane for possessiveness is horizontal in scope.
Such biological predispositions in how we view and relate to land
are further bolstered by the socio-economic culture of the United
States. Biologically, ownership of real property engenders a defined
band of emotional attachments. Humans are conditioned to ground
themselves in their horizontal environment and to claim nearby
space with a characteristic absoluteness. Strong feelings surround
this sense of ownership and any attack on its inviolability produces
immediate outrage and defensive strategies. The idea that one's
property is one's individual domain "feels" correct. Ownership car-
ries with it the sensations of stability, security, and well-being.2
The particular American cultural orientation toward property as a
thing to be exploited and developed reinforces this evolutionary
bias. Our history of "taming" the wilderness reveals strong biases to-
ward the sanctity of land ownership and paramount control over
possessions. Our relation to land has not been based upon a recog-
2" See Gruter, supra note 252, at 222 (stating that "[t]he visual stimuli of perceiving individu-
als together, or an individual and an object (container, tool, weapon or prey) as a gestalt, may
trigger endorphin production.")
2". See IRENAUs EIBL-EIBESFELDT, WARFARE, MAN'S INDOCTRINABILI-Y AND GROUP SELECTION
129 (Primus 1992).
'- See id. In the kibbutz, children became attached to objects in a possessive way. Kibbutz
children have fixed sitting places and own and defend their toys. When adults attempted to
reverse the birthday ritual and have the birthday child give presents rather than receive gifts,
the experiment was a failure.
257 Id.
See generally Neal Milner, Ownership Rights and the Rites of Ownership, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
227 (1993) (discussing how a sense of entitlement in ownership rights can be found in land-
owner narratives).
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nition of the resource's intrinsic value; rather, its economic impor-
tance to the individual takes center stage. Exploitation, rather than
conservation, has been the predominant ethos. Physical control over
my immediate environment dominates. Psychologically, the individ-
ual's relation to land is defined by notions of control, power, and
self-identity.2s'
The historical myth of the American conquest of the West like-
wise reinforces, and is reinforced by, this psychological orientation.
Americans "opened the West" to progresse& and "brought civilization
to the unenlightened."26' Culturally such themes reinforce our basic
biology and underscore an individual braggadocio toward ownership
rights. Private property rights provided the foundation of the
American miracle. We as a society are defined by this history. Also,
much of our self-pride and national enthusiasm emanate from this
land relation. Individual farmers and ranchers, battling encroaching
"outsiders" and threatening elements, are American icons. We can
readily relate to a television show such as "Bonanza", where the Pon-
derosa 62 was the central figure tying the characters and the stories
together. Land is integrally part of the American persona, its magi-
cal power instilled into our conceptions of ourselves. How we relate
and approach property-rights issues are directly influenced by this
social patterning. The land is my home and any invasion or restric-
tion of it by someone else expressly threatens me. The "my-ness" of
my land attains heightened status. More than just a "thing," land be-
comes an integral part of the human. Private land ownership there-
fore also grounds this idiosyncratic American personality.
Initially influenced by biological predispositions to cling to sur-
rounding property2 and taught by American culture to perceive
land ownership as a sacred right. Americans begin the takings debate
2" See id. at 236-37 (arguing that landowners value interdependence and community, con-
dominium owners value self-preservation, and all see land as part of their identity); C( J.G.
Manning, Demotic F4 ptian Instruments of Transfer as Evidence for Private Ow nship of Real Prpetny,
71 CH.-KENT L REV. 237 (1995) (discussing that very clearly defined concepts of private owner-
ship existed in ancient Egypt).
"' See Donald W. Large, This Land is lazose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Pprt, 1973
WIS. L REv. 1039, 1044 (1973). Using words such as "open," 'progress," and 'development" to
signify conversion of the natural terrain to agricultural or commercial lands carry with them the
implication that the change is good. Americans displayed a "cowboy menelity" that %-ewed land
as a replaceable commodity that could be controlled for profit.
"' See generally FRANcIS PAUL PRUcHA, THE GREAT FATHER (1984) (discussing the history of
the American government and the American Indians); WILLL.LN CRONO.N, CKNGES IN THE
LND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE EcOLOGY OF NEW ENGLND (1983); LRGE, supra, note 260.
Native Americans were commonly referred to as savages, pagans, aborigines, and unci.ilized. It
was the white Europeans' "burden" to take this wild country and bring order and prosperity.
This particularlyJudeo-Christian world-%iew is clearly reflected in Johnson v. M7ntmh, 21 U.S. (8
'Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2 Significantly, we humanize this land mass by giving it a name.
'0 See supra notes 249-257 and accompanying texL
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with an overwhelming prejudice in favor of the rights of private
property owners. Because the focus of this orientation is predomi-
nately horizontal, certain "transgressions" are allowed. We recognize
the need for governmental regulation in many areas of our life and
we even admit to some degree of regulation of our land. Certain
governmental regulation actually enhances property value and con-
sequently is encouraged.26 Thus, many zoning regulations become
readily acceptable since their impact is perceived as property-
supporting rather than property-threatening. 6  Regulation that
leads to enhanced value is universally accepted as a "proper" func-
tion of government, even by the most avid of the property-rightists.
Such an increase in the fair market value of property supports our
conception of the nature and function of property, reaffirming the
individual's biological and cultural expectations.
However, where the government seeks to deny completely the
perceived and deeply felt relation between an individual and his
property, dysfunction results. The psychological nexus is ripped
apart and schizophrenic reactions become an expected, natural con-
sequence. The intense passion associated with takings issues reflects
the underlying discord that arises when our conception of the rela-
tionship between people and property is fundamentally altered by a
judicial or legislative act. While our species has a great plasticity, we
only bend so far. The Holmes threshold (stating that regulation
that, "goes too far... will be recognized as a taking"6) may in effect
be an indicator of the outer limits of this basic property gestalt. Feel-
ings of unfairness and injustice arise when basic notions are chal-
lenged or rejected to too great of an extent. If we are biologically
pre-wired to conceive of land in a certain defined way, such predis-
positions will necessarily influence our takings calculus. However
much we might rationally understand the need to make adjustments
to a wide range of social necessities, we often are captives of our evo-
lutionary and cultural pasts.
2 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
This of course was the primary focus of Euclid. Zoning is characteristically defended as a
system of reciprocal benefits and burdens that enhances the community as a whole. Alfred
Bettman, the era's leading advocate and defender of zoning, noted its advantage as follows:
"[F]or in exchange of the restrictions which it places on each piece of property, it places restric-
tions for each piece of property, that is for the benefit of each piece of property, and protects
each piece of property, as well as gives to each piece of property its share of the general health,
order, convenience, and security which the whole plan brings to the community." Brief amicus
curiae for the National Conference on City Planning, The National Housing Association and the
Massachusetts Federation of Town Planning Boards at 37, Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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B. Shaping the Denominator
As the first part of this article has detailed,6 a significant event
for takings jurisprudence is the determination of the relevant parcel
against which to apply diminution analysis. Because any takings
formula must begin with a definition of the unit of property to be
examined, it is important to understand how we may be uncon-
sciously biased in our evaluation about, and calculation of, the ap-
propriate unit. Evolution has fostered a deep reverence in our spe-
cies for land and possession. Humans tend to "cling" to their
immediate surroundings, evidencing a territorial imperative com-
mon268 to many other species. We therefore begin any inquiry with
considerable psychological baggage. At gut level, land is not com-
mon property, equally available to all.an Nor do we begin with a feel-
ing that community value has significantly contributed to the land's
inherent worth. Once I attach land as "mine," my perspective is in
many ways predetermined by my biology- external interference with
my dominion and control is perceived as hostile and villainous. Ex-
ternal limitations on my free use and development are compre-
hended as corrupt and unfair. The individual intuitively takes the
initial land bundle as an aggregate, predisposed to perceive the ac-
quisition as a unified whole. Such feelings apply to horizontal di-
mensions of the initial land mass acquired, reflecting the predomi-
nance of our sense of sight in orienting ourselves in the world. In
short, it seems natural to consider the surface dimension of the ac-
quired whole as the relevant parcel.
Culture too, instills and reinforces this horizontal bias. The rug-
ged individualism of western mythology and our capitalist-based
economy encourage us to regard land ownership as absolute. Indi-
vidualsxerceive themselves as not merely holding a loose "bundle of
sticks," but as wielding a solid staff of biblical proportions. Land is
See supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
See generally ROBERTARDRE, THE TERRITORIAL L PERATIVE (1966). Humans are markedly
territorial as are many animal species. Such territoriality functions to fonvwad feeding efficiency
and survival, thereby increasing reproductive success. See ahsoJOHN ALcocK, A.Ni..tAL BE.LWIOR
279-319 (1993) (discussing territoriality in the ecology of finding a place to live and finding food
to eat); GEORGE C. NVILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION, 240-243 (1996) (discuss-
ing the territoriality of animals).
'0 Such theories provide interesting diversions for legal theorists. They reflect who we might
become, but certainly not who we are.
r'0 Property is often analogized to a bundle of sticks: a grouping of rights and obligations that
can vary in size and scope. Some sticks may be removed from te bundle without engendering
a takings; others, such as the "right to exclude," are considered essential to the notion of private
property. See genera!y LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FoUND.ATIONs 11-21
(1977) (discussing various theories of property rights); JOHN CHRSTMIA.. THE MiTi OF
PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP 3-27 (1994) (discussing te mean-
ing of ownership); J.E. Penner, The "Bundk of Righlts" Picure of Proprtvy, 43 UCLA L RE'. 711
(1996) (describing the bundle of rights picture as powerfully amorphous. presenting a vision of
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meant to accommodate the human realm. Complete dominion and
control over one's property ensures high dominion and control over
one's self. Much of an individual's wealth is a reflection of the indi-
vidual's property worth; security, status, individual fulfillment, and
reproductive success are often inherently related to land acquisition
and control. Individual self-esteem is a product of land valuation.
Any curb on free development and exploitation of these ownership
rights weakens the resource by weakening the attractiveness to the
market.
Culture thus further conditions us to regard property selfishly
and to perceive it with a sense of inviolability and sacredness. This
absoluteness maintains a largely horizontal bias since this is the ma-
jor plane of economic development.27 Generally, it is what one can
grow, build, or use on the surface that dictates the parcel's value.
Such horizontal economies transform themselves into horizontal
psychological orientations. We understand our surface development
rights as our absolute property realm. Culturally, this "kingdom-
gestalt" seems right; it "feels"just.
To the extent that we are predisposed by our biology and culture
to view property with a particularly horizontal bias, the "diminution
in value" standard becomes more clearly defined. The mechanics as-
sociated with the vertical calculus can be dispensed with, regardless
of Rehnquistian jurisprudential webs arguing for vertical valuation. 2
Our sympathies are simply not vested in this realm. As long as sur-
face viability is maintained, huge restrictions on other parts of the
vertical cylinder become acceptable. The ease with which Penn Cen-
tral has been received offers some evidence of this psychological ori-
entation.2 Given the extraordinary value associated with New York
air rights and the somewhat extenuated notion of landmark preser-
vation as a significant piece of the common good, one could expect
significant outcry. However, as long as the economic viability of
Grand Central was continued, the economies of air space claimed a
much lesser role. Sympathy for other types of use diminution is only
intermittently aroused when the landowner's surface use continues
property which is difficult to define precisely and so criticize with effect); Thomas Ross, Meta-
phor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055-1063 (1989) (discussing how the bundle is a meta-
phorical characterization of the aggregate of legally recognized rights).
"' Although development can reach subsurface and vertical importance, the major orienta-
tion is in the horizontal realm.
2' See supra notes 167-176 and accompanying text.
'" Penn Central stimulated a literal storm of commentary, most of it very positive. See Marga-
ret Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: Fairness and Accommodation Show the Way
Out of the Takings Corner, 13 URB. LAW. 89 (1981); Norman Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central
Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a Resolution of the Regula-
tory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731 (1978); EugeneJ. Morris, Three "Landmark" Real Property
Cases, 9 PROBATE AND PROPERTY 7 (1980).
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to be viable and productive. Because our basic psychology is not ne-
gated, the Court's ruling gains authority.
While many might decide the case differently, most can emotion-
ally and rationally accept the Court's majority decision. We are not
outraged; we are merely "on the other side". This dialectic has pro-
vided the foundation for a number of significant cases ithin the
past decade, most notably the Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous
CoaL24 Even notions of "investment-backed expectations" ' seem in-
explicably tied to horizontal, rather than vertical, space. Simply put,
as long as some "normal" surface use is allowed, human empathy is
slow to arouse. Although our reason may direct us toward embrac-26
ing the basis of conceptual severance, we appear unable to freely
acknowledge the "equality" of air and subsurface property. Contin-
ued viability of the horizontal plane allows great interference with
the vertical dimension.
Conversely, when the surface use is significantly disrupted, empa-
thy pours in. From a species and cultural standpoint, an inability to
use the surface is unacceptable, tantamount to denying the inherent
symbiosis that exists between individuals and their land. Where gov-
ernmental ordinances limit the free use of a private owner's horizon-
tal space, there is an immediate "gut" reaction. Our biological pre-
wiring evokes feelings of outrage. We react with moral aggression, in
part as a response to species-programmed expectations. Given this
reaction, it is of little surprise that the most vehemently pursued tak-
ings cases involve drastic limitations of the surface property use.
Wetlands regulation is perhaps the most aggressively scrutinized
body of land use restrictions in the past few decades. " Considering
the enormous and scientifically unquestioned value that wetlands
present,rs one might wonder why the debate has been so acrimoni-
" 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
See Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 127 ("[St]tatute[s] that substantially further important public
policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking%.1.
"6 See Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Taoings, 46J. LEGaL EmDC. 586. at 592 (1996).
(pointing out that at least three members of the current court can be counted as firm concep-
tual-severance supporters, withJustice O'Connor ha'ing used the concept in Inrtngand perhaps
predisposed to use it again under the right circumstances, leading the Court just one short of a
conceptual-severance majority).
Wetlands are t-ansitional areas, lying between identifiable bodies of uater and dry land.
They constitute about five percent of the land area of the lower forty-eight states, or approxi-
mately 103.3 million acres. See THOMAS E. DAHL AND CRAIG E. JOHNSON, U.S. DEPT OF
INTERIOR, STATUS AND TRENDS OF AETLANDS IN THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES: MID-1970'S
TO NiD-1980'S (1991). An additional 200 million acres of wetlands are located in AMaska. See
Sherry Lynn Jacobs, Comment, StrenThening edland Protection Programs Through State Regulation,
21 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 227, 228 (1987).
" See 1 D.D. HOOK, THE ECOLOGY AND MAVNAGFMENT OF WVETLANDS 214 at 7-8 (1988); Tho-
mas Hanley, Comment, A Devdoper's Deam: The United Stales Claims Court's ew AnaIsu of Sectum
404 Takings Challenge, 19 B.C. ENvrL AFF. L REV. 317.322 (1991) ('WetLands are valuable both
for their intrinsic qualities and their ecological functions."); Joseph A Hedal. Note. The Cean
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ous. But wetlands are all about surface use and as such, the outcry
reflects a low tolerance for surface use interference. Public scrutiny
of these regulations often dismisses the considered jurisprudence
underlying the restrictions. This is not a rational debate where the
better of two sides will triumph; weighed policy arguments are not
necessarily the most convincing.
Similarly, in other forms of environmental regulation where one
might expect greater consideration for the societal effects of private
development and therefore less enthusiasm for rancorous takings
claims, one finds some of the most emotionally-driven suits. 2 9 Sig-
nificant prohibition of surface development plainly cannot be ra-
tionalized away. Even with a population of individuals reared on im-
ages of Bambi and Smoky the Bear, the Endangered Species Act has
astonishingly little public support."0 There remains something sac-
rosanct about the horizontal plane; there remains a deep cultural
bias toward land use and economic development.
Lucas presents a case in point. Prohibited from developing a
home on his beachfront lot, Lucas attacked the state's legislation
aimed at protecting property and preventing the accelerated erosion
of the beach/dune system. Faced with such significant competing
interests, one might expect a fairly divided populace. The outcry,
however, was essentially one-sided. Lucas was branded a modem-day
hero by Justice Scalia's majority opinion; the government was vilified.
By ruling that regulations which deprive a landowner of all economi-
Water Act-More Section 404: The Supreme Court Gets Its Feet Wet, 65 B.U.L.REV. 995, 996 (1985) (ar-
guing that wetlands act to maintain the integrity of watersheds by reducing the overall effect of
flooding, by controlling erosion, and by purifying the water.); V. Donald Hilley, Note, The War-
ren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984: Enough Protection?, 9 NOVA L.J. 141, 142 (1984)
(noting that wetlands "are unquestionably important to health and welfare of future genera.
tions").
See Michael Doyle, Bill Targets Losses From Regulation, SACRAMENTO BEE, March 4, 1995, at
Al (discussing California bill that would compensate landowners who lose value due to govern-
ment regulation); Randall Edwards, Vanishing Wetlands, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 1997, at
4C (discussing how Ohio has lost 90% of its wetlands); Lynne K Varner, Wetlands' Label Swamps
a New Farmer's Drean--Foreclosure Looms for Farm, SEATLE TIMES, May 7, 1997, at Al (discussing
the case of one farmer as a means to look at the question of whether "a few: should bear the
cost of environmental policies that benefit the many).
'. See Tom Kenworthy, Politics Imperils Uncommon Alliance's Plan to Find Grizzlies a Home, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 1997, at AS (relating story of one man's willingness to kill grizzlies despite prohi-
bition of Endangered Species Act); Tom Uhlenbrock, Activist Takes Takeover Theory to the People,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 1997, at 7A (quoting one activist as saying, "[tjhey'll bring in
the Endangered Species Act and find some little bug in your lawn.... [y]ou get to hate wild-
life.").
... 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
m See Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250(1) (a) (Supp. 1990) (stating
it was in the state's best interest "to protect and promote increased public access to South Caro-
lina's beaches for out-of-state tourism"); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039 (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing).
[Vol. 1: 1
ThE MEASURING STICK OFREGULA TORY TAKINGS
cally viable use of land are takings per se, the Court adopted a very
limited and narrow categorical rule. However, the Court gained
broad praise for its "sweeping decision"2 and was widely heralded
for its defense of individual rights. In reality, Lucas accomplished lit-
tle of any jurisprudential value.' The Court rested its decision on
the very questionable trial court finding " that the Lucas' lot had
been rendered valueless by the state's enforcement of its coastal-zone
construction ban.27 Allegations are sometimes as effective as fact,
and the picture of Lucas' family prevented from building its dream
home produced powerful biological responses. The connection be-
tween surface territory and notions of shelter, nurture, and safety are
powerful archetypes in the human consciousness. Environmental
and social realities pale in comparison to the genetic behavioral pro-
pensities associated with land. When focused on the horizontal di-
mension, our sensitivities are magnified and it becomes extremely
difficult to resist Lucas' pleas. Our culturally-biased perception lead
us to believe that Lucas-dictated circumstance threaten both the in-
dividual's proper relation to property as well as the established no-
tion of property as market value. The uselessness of the land's sur-
face evokes strong feelings. We are pre-wired towards categorizing
Lucas' situation as a paradigm of injustice and unfairness. Policy ar-
guments supporting governmental intervention pale in comparison.
2 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. (stating that although property owners expect that the uses of
land will be restricted from time to time by the State through legitimate exercise of police
power, it can avoid compensation when the State deprives land of all economically beneficial
use only where "the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with,- such as
when the intended use constitutes a public nuisance).
Geoffrey A. Cambell, High Court: Owners to be Paid MITzm State Laws Affed Pemrpty, BON'D
BUYER, June 30, 1992, at 6 ("[Lucas is] one bright jewel that advances property rights princi-
ples"); L Jane Lehman, This Land is my Land, Propeity Rights Mormnt Pits Landaomers, &cist5,
L.A. TIMEs, October 4, 1992, at K1 ("Lucas became one of the first folk heroes of the young but
growing private property rights movement"); Sylvia Lewis, Lucas Ruling: Shifting Sand Suth
Carolina Coastal Couni PLANNING, Aug. 1992 at 30 ("Experts say the implications [of Lucas]
could be momentous, especially for wetlands regulations and open space preservaion");Jono-
than Marshall, Big V"doty for Property Owners: States May Have to Pay if T7y Ban Derelopmetnt, S.F.
CHRONICLE, June 30, 1992, at Al ("[Lucas is] a significant ictory for property owmers"); l1k-
tory!-Lucas 'ins High Court Property Rights Ruling BUSINESS WIRE, June 29. 1992 ("This land-
mark ruling sends a dear message to government regulators"); You Tae4 You Pay, CowmRcLAL
APPEAL, July 4, 1992, at A12 ("The Supreme Court has taken a large step toward banning what
had become the legalized theft of private property").
m See Eruc T. Freyfogel, The Owning and Taing of Sensitive Lands 43 UCLA L Rev. 77 (1995);
Fisher m, supra note 164; Humbach, supra note 3.
2 See Lucas; 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (describing remaining value to own-
ership of land).
27 See id. at 1009. The Court noted that the lower court's finding that the lots had been ren-
dered valueless was the premise of the Petition for Certiorari. Because this finding was not chal-
lenged in the Brief in Opposition, the Court declined to entertain the argument in the respon-
dent's brief on the merits. Cf. id. at 1044 n.6 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that the issue
was not disposed of on remand).
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Such biological and cultural analysis explains the extraordinary
resilience of the property-rightist position. Notwithstanding decades
of legal decisions to the contrary, they steadfastly refuse to release
any of the "my-ness" of their horizontal domain. Essentially, human
biology interferes with, and acts as a subterfuge to, rational examina-
tion of the issue. There are few legal questions with which the legal
system has wrestled for so long, and few issues where the lay individ-
ual seems so at odds with the controlling legal precedent. Recogni-
tion of our species' patterning can free us to address the issue more
directly and with less subconscious cultural baggage. Understanding
who we truly are is the first step toward enlightenment.
C. Formulating a Calculus
The problem of defining the relevant unit of property for takings
purposes is essentially a problem of perception. Our notions of fair-
ness and justice in this area are so wedded to our culture's narrow
view of an individual's relation to land that reasoned discourse is of-
ten displaced by a form of ideological fervor. Although counseled
jurisprudence has engineered some deviation in the vertical realm,"s
our emotional attachment to the horizontal dimension remains firm.
Biology and culture provide windows through which we can under-
stand the passionate devotion of Americans to the notion of "hori-
zontal privilege." We clearly are property-rightists at heart. But while
biological predispositions and cultural orientations help form and
direct the law, they do not necessitate the current legal indecision in
the area. Indeed, it is a particularly human characteristic to be able
to go beyond our inherent prejudices and learned behaviors and to
construct laws that more positively advance the human situation. If
we can all benefit from instituting a particular legal matrix, it be-
hooves us to do so even at the expense of certain ingrained behav-
iors. 89 Understanding why we are the way we are provides insight
into our behaviors that can help liberate us from many of the bonds
of our culture and thereby allow us to more freely evaluate the issues
2'3 See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
m This is not to argue that we should recklessly discard all cultural or biological predisposi-
tions. However, while acknowledging that they have served our needs well to date, we should
view these predispositions critically in evaluating their value for the future. while the common
outcome of natural selection is the promotion of the long-term survival of the organism, some-
times fitness maximization leads to increased specialization, causing reduced numbers, re-
stricted range, or increased vulnerability to environmental changes. See generally, ROBERT
TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985);JOHNATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF
EvOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994); WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION 17-19, 27-28,
211-212(1966). We should be aware also that long-term fitness maximization may come in con-
flict with our current ideals regarding land use.
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before us. This is certainly true with respect to establishing a takings
calculus and defining the unit of relevant parcel.-
From a purely policy-based analysis, resolution of this issue of
parcel definition seems fairly straightforward: identify the relevant
parcel as the entirety of the originally purchased tract. This simple
orientation provides a workable definition that maximizes clarity,
simplicity, and economic efficiency.' Takings calculus would be
narrowed to considering only a single moment of time, the date of
purchase. In most instances, the parameters of the original deed
would provide a bright definition of the factual setting uncluttered
by notions of historical expectation or multi-use planning. Since the
parcel is defined at the moment of acquisition, the owner can factor
m a possible "takings quotient." m Laden with the understanding
that the parameters of the acquisition will dictate the parameters of
the horizontal calculus, investors are enabled to make real-life busi-
ness decisions against their gauge of the boundaries of potential
regulatory activity at their site. Such predictability leads to low ad-
ministrative costs as well as increased certainty in, and efficiency of,
management.
When diminution analysis is performed against the original tract,
we are also able to maintain a baseline legitimacy to our takings cal-
culus. Even though our senses of fairness and justice are firmly wed-
ded to our biological and cultural predispositions which call for pre-
serving the economic and physical sovereignty of the horizontal
dimension, we tend to consider an original purchase as a single
event, unified in time and space. Reciprocity considerations, a basic
prerequisite to legitimacy, are more easily weighed within a fixed ge-
stalt of limited variables. s Land acquisitions bring defined contexts
whose logical boundaries provide concrete instances of reciprocal al-
truism. The value of Grand Central Terminal is in part a reflection
of the decades of governmental regulation and subsidies in the sur-
rounding areas. 4 The monetary significance of Lucas' two parcels
2" This essay does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the proper takings denomina-
tor. Its focus is to explain the idiosyncratic American perspective in terms of biological and cul-
tur-al factors. A full analysis of the "original purchase" standard is left for another time.
2 See supra at notes 149-162 and accompanying text.
While they rarely can be certain, investors make educated calculations about the probabili
ties and the extent of regulation. Most investors recognize existing areas of concern (such as
wetland potential) and know of, or can easily discover, pending legislation.
2s Indeed, such a restrictive definition is necessary given the wide array of factors contribut-
ing to the property's economic value. Fiscal viability is often the result of opportunities for ex-
ploitation created by society itself The community provides the social, historical, and cultural
significance upon which much of the fair market value derives. See Coletta. supra note 124. at
360-364.
H See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of MNew York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (1977). Here the
court noted.
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evidences the success of coastal management and the importance of
usage separations gained from public zoning. Such governmental
largess is given more recognition when silhouetted against the origi-
nal purchase. Indeed, the legitimacy of the state's regulatory author-
ity is largely based upon the reciprocal advantages that accrue to in-
dividual owners on their individual parcels. While most government
limitation is received with skepticism and disapproval, recognition of
some tit-for-tat"5 lends more than a smidgen of validity to this "new
math."
By categorizing the relevant parcel as the originally purchased
tract, most jurisprudential concerns with conceptual (or actual) sev-
erance disappear. Owners will be unable to enlist the selective math
of Loveladies 6 and Florida Rock to argue an economic wipeout if in
fact surrounded by a history of economic windfall. Therefore, if the
landowner subsequently subdivides the parcel, the original whole
will still provide the denominator of the takings calculation. Concep-
tual severance issues such as split zoning and multiple factor analysis
likewise are muffled. The manufactured jurisprudential concerns of
multiple use designations and the unworkability of multiple ele-
ments are summarily dismissed by the simplicity of the calculation.
Perhaps the major challenge to this definition would be the type of
manufactured severance that has been so hotly pursued in the verti-
cal domain.297 Developers could engineer acquisition plans whereby
they would purchase entire communities on a single-lot basis. By
limiting the calculus to each lot's defined purchase area, such devel-
opers would magnify the scope and effect of any regulation and
thereby maximize the potential for takings compensation. However,
this possibility could be minimized by a simple rule regarding the
integration of contiguous lots when purchased as part of an underly-
ing scheme, in much the same way that reciprocal servitudes are es-
tablished. In any event, the sheer administrative nightmare of deal-
Of course it may be argued that had Grand Central Terminal never been built, this area
would not have developed as it has. Thus, the argument runs, construction of the termi-
nal triggered growth of the area, and created much of the terminal property's current
value .... [I]n reality, it is of little moment which comes first, the terminal or the travel-
ers. For it is the interaction of economic influences in the greatest megalopolis of the
western hemisphere-the terminal initially drawing people to the area, and the society
developing the area with shops, hotels, office buildings, and unmatched civil services-
that has made the property so valuable. Of primary significance, however, is that society
as an organized entity, especially through its government, rather than as a mere conglom-
erate of individuals, has created much of the value of the terminal property.
29 See generally Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
SCIENCE 1390-1396 (1981) (showing that tit-for-tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy, as once
the genes for cooperation exist, natural selection will promote strategies that base cooperative
behavior on environmental cues.)
26 See supra note 179.
2" See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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ing with each parcel separately would likely discourage developers
from practicing in this manner.
The striking advantage of limiting the denominator to the origi-
nally purchased tract should not be lost by our emotional attach-
ment to a certain, very American conception of property. If it is true
that humans are yielding toward the vertical axis but passionately de-
fensive of the horizontal domain, we should expect much more dis-
sonance when deciding regulatory takings questions along the
"metes and bounds" dimension rather than along the "height and
depth" realm. This has been the undeniable pattern for the past
seven decades. Even though most courts seem committed to defin-
ing the takings denominator as the originally purchased tract, we are
not. Our "human-ness," our "Americanism," keeps distancing us
from consistent, rational analysis. This is not to say that there are no
sound positions to the contrary. Neither Rehnquist nor Scalia need
be labeled as emotive Neanderthals. But the attractiveness of their
argument for most individuals depends less on its analytical power
than on its "gut" force. We are "programmed" to resist mightily any
restriction within our horizontal realm.
V. CONCLUSION
The economics of diminution demand a clear measuring stick.
Without a workable and consistent definition of "relevant parcel,"
the diminution calculus becomes merely a tool for enterprising
judges to manipulate decisions toward their own jurisprudential
leanings. Courts have failed to clearly delineate, or even reach gen-
eral consensus about, the unit of property against which economic
impact is to be measured for regulatory takings purposes. Seven
decades of discourse have produced a wealth of cases that provides
little more than individualized position papers on a myriad of possi-
ble alternatives. Lack of direction by, and misdirection within, the
Supreme Court has compounded the problem by creating a climate
of confusion and a general lack of accountability.
Given the immediate and relatively transparent advantage of lim-
iting the takings denominator to the physical dimensions of the
original purchase, this century-old debate assumes the character of a
true Greek tragedy. The inability of legal analysis and counseled ju-
risprudence to resolve these issues evidences the resilience of our bi-
ology and the strong influence of our culture. However powerful
these forces may be, they need not confine us to Sisyphean exertions
of futility. Our basic biological predispositions evolved to maximize
our inclusive fitness. Culture likewise functions to advance the hu-
man interest. To the extent each fails to serve us well in our modern
setting, we should not hesitate to move forward. Recognition of dys-
functional ties is the starting point for "breaking the chains." The
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American orientation toward property, an orientation which may
have served us well at one time, is in great need of realignment. En-
vironmental concerns and resource scarcity can ill-afford a jurispru-
dence that is better suited to a world of resource abundance and in-
dividual monopoly.
Biology and culture predispose us to view land as personal and
sacrosanct. Outside meddling by the government engenders imme-
diate negative responses and instills feelings of injustice. We cannot,
however, and should not, allow these basic predispositions to blind
us to reasoned resolution of the issue. The issue of regulatory tak-
ings demands the best of judgment and reason. Certainly, determi-
nation of this issue should depend less on the way we are con-
structed and more on the underlying advantages of the competing
positions.
